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Chapter1 3
“The moral force of fairness is greatly reinforced by the power of a 
fair result to focus attention, if it fi lls the vacuum of indeterminacy 
that would otherwise exist.”
Thomas C. Schelling (1960, p.73)
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A real-world social dilemma: the electricity blackout
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Chapter 1
Introduction
 In many real life situations, people experience a confl ict between their own 
personal interest and the interest of the group to which they belong. For instance, 
people are often confronted with situations in which they have access to scarce or 
limited common resources, such as energy, fi sh, oil or water. Whereas people might 
be tempted to further their self-interest by harvesting excessively from these common 
resources, such resources should be consumed wisely and sparingly in order to 
prevent them from becoming depleted. After all, depletion of the common resource 
is detrimental to the whole group (Hardin, 1968). A well-known real-life example of 
such a situation is the environmental problem of over-fi shing. In this situation, a group 
of fi shermen have access to a natural common resource, namely the fi sh population. 
When individual fi shermen choose to further their self-interest by catching as many fi sh 
as they can, the collective interest is jeopardized because excessive fi shing increases 
the chance of the fi sh stock becoming depleted. So whereas individual fi shermen may 
be tempted to overuse the common resource, the collective interest calls for moderate 
consumption.
Situations such as the one described above are generally referred to as social 
dilemmas. In such social dilemmas, people thus have to choose whether they want to 
further either their self-interest or the interest of their group. When they choose to further 
their self-interest this is called defection or non-cooperation and when they choose to 
further the collective interest this is called cooperation. A non-cooperative choice yields 
the best pay-off to individual group members (in at least one of the possible outcome 
confi gurations; Liebrand & Messick, 1996), whereas all individual group members are 
better off if all cooperate than if all defect (see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Kopelman, 
Weber, & Messick, 2002; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004, for reviews). Social 
dilemmas in which a group of people have access to a limited common resource are 
usually referred to as common resource dilemmas.1 A real-life example of a common 
resource dilemma is the problem of electricity blackouts. Such blackouts occur 
when the electricity grid breaks down because the collective demand for electricity 
is higher than the available supply (for more real-life examples, see Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994).
1   The common resource dilemma is one specifi c type of social dilemma. Another well-known type of social 
dilemma is the public good dilemma, in which a group of people can contribute endowments to realize a public 
good. In the present dissertation, I focus primarily on common resource dilemmas. However, in the general 
discussion I will also discuss the implications of our fi ndings for public good dilemmas.
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Environmental Uncertainty in Social Dilemmas
In real life, common resource dilemmas are often characterized by 
environmental uncertainty (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). Environmental 
uncertainty is uncertainty regarding characteristics of the task environment of a social 
dilemma. In many real-life social dilemmas, it is uncertain how large the common 
resource is and how many people have access to the common resource. For example, 
electricity consumers often do not know how large the capacity of the electricity grid is. 
Experimental studies on single-trial common resource dilemmas are designed to capture 
the primary elements of the interdependence described in this blackout example. Such 
studies have shown that environmental uncertainty can have a substantial impact on 
people’s decisions, often leading to over-harvesting and overestimation of the size of 
the common resource (e.g., Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; Gustafsson, Biel, & 
Gärling, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 1992; Suleiman 
& Budescu, 1999). Therefore, in earlier research it was repeatedly concluded that 
environmental uncertainty is detrimental to the collective interest. However, it should 
be noted that the bulk of earlier studies have only focused on one specifi c type of 
environmental uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the size of the common resource 
(also referred to as resource size uncertainty).
The fi nding that resource size uncertainty leads to over-harvesting and 
overestimation of the common resource can be explained in a number of different 
ways. Two plausible explanations are (a) the outcome-desirability explanation and 
(b) the egoism-justifi cation explanation (for descriptions and tests of these two 
explanations, see Biel & Gärling, 1995; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 
2006; Gärling, Gustafsson, & Biel, 1999; Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2000). The 
outcome-desirability explanation suggests that people are overoptimistic about the size 
of the uncertain common resource and that they therefore overestimate the size of this 
resource. As a result of this over-optimism, they harvest excessively from uncertain 
common resources. The egoism-justifi cation explanation, by contrast, suggests 
that people may use environmental uncertainty as a means to justify their own non-
cooperative harvesting decisions. In other words, under uncertainty people can justify 
their over-harvesting by giving higher estimates of the size of the common resource. 
Experimental studies by Gustafsson et al. (1999a; 1999b; see also De Vries & Wilke, 
1992) have yielded results that corroborate the outcome-desirability explanation.
Although these earlier studies have expanded our understanding of the 
underlying psychological effects of over-harvesting, it should be noted that these 
studies have primarily focused on the effects of environmental uncertainty on harvesting 
decisions and resource size estimates. However, groups are characterized by more 
than just harvests and estimates. After all, groups may be characterized by a broad 
spectrum of interpersonal processes. In the context of common resource dilemmas, 
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people may try to (tacitly) coordinate their decisions with their fellow group members; 
They may try to make decisions they can easily justify to these group members; And 
they may become angry at one another when they assume that their fellow group 
members have harvested more than they were entitled to. In order to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of the consequences of environmental uncertainty in social 
dilemmas, such interpersonal processes deserve further investigation. Therefore, 
the present dissertation will not only focus on effects of environmental uncertainty 
on harvests and estimates, but also on the infl uence of uncertainty on interpersonal 
processes in social dilemmas. It will be argued that environmental uncertainty may have 
important consequences for several key aspects of these interpersonal processes
To investigate how environmental uncertainty infl uences interpersonal 
processes, a new perspective on this topic will be presented. It will be argued that 
environmental uncertainty can severely hamper the application of the equal division 
rule. In turn, the notion that the application of this rule is hampered has various 
different consequences for what happens within groups. More specifi cally, the present 
dissertation will show that environmental uncertainty infl uences three key aspects of 
interpersonal processes in social dilemmas, namely (a) how people tacitly coordinate 
their choice behavior, (b) how they justify their decisions to others, and (c) how they 
respond affectively to other people’s choice behavior.
The Importance of the Equal Division Rule
 In a typical experimental common resource dilemma, participants are 
collectively endowed with a resource of money or chips from which each group member 
can harvest. As long as the total group harvest does not exceed the resource size all 
individual harvests are granted. If the collective harvest, however, exceeds the amount 
available in the common resource, the resource becomes depleted and all group 
members receive zero outcomes (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 
1999b; Rapoport et al., 1992), as in the case of an electricity blackout. Therefore, it is 
in the interest of each individual group member as well as in the interest of the group 
that the total group harvest does not exceed the size of the common resource.
In common resource dilemmas, it is therefore important for people to 
coordinate their harvesting decisions effi ciently. To prevent individual and collective 
interests from being harmed, group members must make sure that the common resource 
is not overused. However, effi cient coordination is often hampered by the fact that group 
members cannot communicate with one another. Furthermore, group members often 
do not know what their fellow group members will decide. In other words, in most social 
dilemmas people are confronted with social uncertainty (also referred to as strategic 
uncertainty; Messick et al., 1988). How can people coordinate under social uncertainty? 
The answer to this question lies in the concept of tacit coordination (Schelling, 1960).
Introduction 9
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 The concept of tacit coordination was developed by the Nobel prize winning 
economist Thomas Schelling (1960). Schelling argued that even in the absence of 
communication people can often coordinate their decisions. To illustrate this, he gave 
an example of two people who want to meet each other in New York City without 
having a prior understanding on where and when to meet. Where would one go and 
at what time? Schelling asked participants this question and found that the majority of 
the people answered that they would go to Central Station at 12.00 noon. If people 
would indeed act accordingly this would mean that tacit coordination would be highly 
effective. Van Dijk and colleagues (e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995, 1996; Van Dijk, Wilke, 
Wilke, & Metman, 1999) applied this concept of tacit coordination to social dilemmas. 
They argued that in social dilemmas, people can successfully coordinate their choice 
behavior by anchoring their decisions on so-called coordination rules.
 Which coordination rule is most often applied in social dilemmas? Earlier 
research (e.g., Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl , 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; De Cremer, 
2003; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993, 1995; Van Dijk et al., 
1999) has shown that in symmetric common resource dilemmas (i.e., all group members 
have equal access to the common resource), most people request an equal share of the 
common resource. For instance, if a common resource of 500 coins is owned by fi ve 
group members, most group members will decide to harvest one-fi fth – or 100 coins 
– from that common resource. In other words, most people will decide to base their 
harvesting decisions on the equal division rule. If all group members do so, the common 
resource is optimally used and there is a perfect balance between individual and collective 
interests. Thus, by anchoring their decisions on coordination rules – such as the equal 
division rule – people can successfully coordinate their choice behavior.
However, the equal division rule is not only useful because it facilitates 
effi cient coordination, but also because it is a rule that generates decisions that are 
considered to be “fair” (e.g., Messick, 1993; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005; 
2006). After all, when all group members decide to adhere to the equal division rule, 
all individual group members end up with an equal share of the common resource. 
In symmetric common resource dilemmas, an equal division is generally considered 
to be a fair outcome. Thus, the application of the equal division rule may not only 
be helpful to ensure optimal use but may also help to establish a fair division of the 
common resource.2 Furthermore, since the equal division rule is such a fair rule it also 
generates decisions that can be easily justifi ed to fellow group members. Altogether, 
these characteristics make the equal division rule highly appealing (Messick, 1993).
 Additionally, since the equal division rule may promote group effi ciency and 
2   It may be interesting to note that Schelling himself (1960, p.73) already hinted at the coordinating potential 
of fairness by writing that “the moral force of fairness is greatly reinforced by the power of a fair result to focus 
attention, if it fi lls the vacuum of indeterminacy that would otherwise exist.”
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fairness – and the rule is only successful when all group members use it – people also 
want their fellow group members to adhere to it. Therefore, they may try to enforce 
the use of the equal division rule. As a consequence, when they learn that their fellow 
group members have violated this rule, they will react quite negatively to these group 
members. More specifi cally, when they learn that someone has harvested more than 
an equal share they will become angry at this person and they will try to punish this rule 
violator for his/her defection (e.g., Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005, 2006). Thus, 
the equal division rule may not only infl uence people’s own harvesting decisions, but 
also how they respond to their fellow group members’ decisions. In several different 
ways, the equal division rule thus seems to be important for how people behave in 
social dilemma situations.
The Equal Division Rule and Environmental Uncertainty
Can people always apply the equal division rule? What happens, for instance, 
when there is uncertainty about the environmental characteristics of a social dilemma? 
In the present dissertation, I will argue that under uncertainty the application of the 
equal division rule is severely hampered. After all, in order to apply the equal division rule 
people need specifi c and accurate information about the task environment of the social 
dilemma. For instance, to calculate an equal share people need to know exactly how 
large the common resource is and how many group members are sharing the common 
resource. When they do not have such accurate environmental information they cannot 
easily calculate how large an equal share is and application of the rule is hampered. 
As a consequence, environmental uncertainty may infl uence several factors that are 
related to the application of the equal division rule, such as the interpersonal processes 
described above, namely: tacit coordination, justifying decisions, and emotional and 
retributive reactions to others.
As was mentioned earlier, environmental characteristics are often uncertain 
in real-life common resource dilemmas. Therefore, the importance of environmental 
uncertainty has been widely acknowledged by social dilemma researchers. In the past 
two decades, numerous experimental studies have been conducted to investigate this 
topic (e.g., Au & Ngai, 2003; Budescu et al., 1990; De Vries & Wilke, 1992; Gustafsson 
et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Hine & Gifford, 1996; Rapoport et al., 1992; Roch & 
Samuelson, 1997; for overviews, see Biel & Gärling, 1995; Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & 
Budescu, 2004; Suleiman & Budescu, 1999). However, as I mentioned before, earlier 
research on environmental uncertainty has mainly focused on harvesting decisions 
and resource size estimates. By also focusing on how such uncertainty infl uences 
interpersonal processes in social dilemmas, the present dissertation aims to add new 
insights to the existing literature in order to generate a more comprehensive picture of 
how people deal with environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.
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Overview of the Present Dissertation
The present dissertation focuses on how environmental uncertainty in social 
dilemmas infl uences several different factors. As was mentioned earlier, the fact that 
environmental uncertainty hampers the application of the equal division rule has a 
number of different consequences. In the above, it was argued that the equal division 
rule infl uences three key aspects of interpersonal processes, namely: (a) how people 
tacitly coordinate their decisions, (b) how they justify their decisions to others, and (c) 
how they respond to the decisions of their fellow group members. Until now, it has 
hardly been investigated how these important issues relate to environmental uncertainty. 
In the present dissertation, I will therefore investigate how these factors are infl uenced 
by environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.
The fi rst two empirical chapters (i.e., Chapters 2 and 3) focus on how 
environmental uncertainty affects tacit coordination and how such uncertainty 
interacts with individual differences (i.e., people’s social value orientations). This topic 
is investigated by manipulating uncertainty about the size of the common resource 
(referred to as resource size uncertainty; see Chapter 2) and by manipulating uncertainty 
about the size of the group (referred to as group size uncertainty; see Chapter 3). In 
these chapters, it is argued that uncertainty hampers tacit coordination. These two 
chapters show that whereas under certainty people base their harvesting decisions on 
external cues (i.e., the equal division rule), under uncertainty they base their decisions 
on internal cues (i.e., their own social value orientations).
In Chapter 4, it is investigated how people justify their own harvesting 
decisions to their fellow group members when there is uncertainty about the size of the 
common resource. To do so, (a) participants are asked about the justifi ability of different 
hypothetical harvests and (b) it is investigated how justifi cation pressures infl uence their 
own harvesting decisions under varying levels of resource size uncertainty. This chapter 
shows that under certainty people justify their harvesting decisions by adhering to the 
equal division rule, whereas under uncertainty they justify their decisions by restricting 
their harvests.3
In Chapter 5, it is investigated how people respond to overuse under resource 
size uncertainty. More specifi cally, in a series of three studies people’s emotional and 
retributive reactions to overuse are investigated. Furthermore, it is argued how these 
reactions can be explained by their causal attributions. This chapter demonstrates that 
the same negative outcome (i.e., overuse) can elicit different affective and retributive 
reactions, depending on whether or not the social dilemma is characterized by 
environmental uncertainty.
3   I would like to note that Chapters 2, 3 & 4 were based on papers that have either been published or that 
have been submitted for publication. Consequently, these chapters can be read separately and there exists 
some overlap between them (especially between the introductions of these chapters).
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In Chapter 6, all of the fi ndings of this dissertation will be summarized and 
discussed. Additionally, the general implications of these fi ndings will be discussed and 
suggestions for future research will be presented.
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Chapter 2
Social Dilemmas as Strong versus 
Weak Situations4
Social dilemmas are situations in which people are faced with a confl ict 
between furthering their personal interests (called defection) and furthering the interests 
of their group (called cooperation). In such dilemmas, a choice to defect yields the 
best pay-off to individual group members in at least one of the possible outcome-
confi gurations, whereas all individual group members are better off if all cooperate than 
if all defect (Liebrand & Messick, 1996; see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Kopelman, Weber, 
& Messick, 2002, for reviews).
A well-known type of social dilemma is the common resource dilemma (also 
referred to as commons dilemma). This dilemma refers to the problem of maintaining 
scarce common resources. A real-life example is the world-wide social dilemma of 
energy consumption. Whereas the collective interest calls for moderate energy 
consumption, personal interests may lead to excessive usage. On a smaller scale, an 
example of the energy consumption dilemma is the problem of electrical blackouts. 
Such blackouts occur when the electricity grid is overloaded because the demand 
for electricity is higher than the available supply. As long as the collective use does 
not exceed a certain threshold, the use of electricity is benefi cial to people’s personal 
interests. However, if this threshold is exceeded, the electricity grid breaks down and 
both collective and personal interests are harmed. 
Experimental studies on common resource dilemmas are designed to 
capture the primary elements of the interdependence structure described above (e.g., 
Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999a; Rapoport, 
Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 1992). In a typical experiment, participants are collectively 
endowed with a resource of money or chips from which each group member can 
request an amount. As long as the total group request does not exceed the resource 
size, all individual requests are granted. If the collective request, however, exceeds 
the amount available in the common resource, the resource becomes depleted and 
all group members receive zero outcomes. It is thus in the interest of each individual 
group member as well as in the interest of the group that the total group request does 
not exceed the size of the common resource.
Therefore, in common resource dilemmas, it is important for people to 
coordinate their choice behavior effi ciently (i.e., by not over-using the common resource). 
4   This chapter is based on De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit and De Cremer (2006).
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In order to do so, people may use their expectations of what their fellow group members 
will decide. However, in most social dilemma situations, people cannot communicate 
with one another and therefore they are uncertain about the decisions of their fellow 
group members. To deal with this social uncertainty (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 
1988), people use so-called tacit coordination rules to make inferences about their 
group members’ choice behavior (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1996). Moreover, people use such 
coordination rules as focal points for their own choice behavior (Schelling, 1960).
Tacit Coordination in Common Resource Dilemmas
 Which coordination rule is most often applied in common resource dilemmas? 
Earlier research (e.g., Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl , 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; De 
Cremer, 2003; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993, 1995; Van Dijk, 
Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999) has shown that in symmetric common resource dilemmas 
(i.e., all group members have equal access to the common resource), most people 
request an equal share of the common resource. For instance, in the experimental set-
up we described earlier, when a common resource contains 500 coins and is owned 
by a group of fi ve group members, participants will often decide to request one-fi fth of 
that resource, namely 100 coins. In other words, in this kind of social dilemma, group 
members anchor their choice behavior on the equal division rule (Allison et al., 1992; 
Samuelson & Allison, 1994). Note that this logic only applies to social dilemma situations 
with a coordination point in which individual and collective interests converge (which is 
the case in almost all experiments on environmental uncertainty; see e.g., Budescu et 
al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al.,1992). In such situations, when all 
group members adhere to the equal division rule the resource is optimally used and a 
perfect balance between personal and collective interests is realized.
Furthermore, to employ the equal division rule, the size of the common 
resource has to be common knowledge to all group members. In order to deal with social 
uncertainty, people need specifi c and exact information about the task environment 
of the social dilemma. Many real-life common resource dilemmas, however, do not 
provide such environmental information. In the blackout example, for instance, it is very 
unlikely that people know with certainty how large the available supply of electricity is. 
What do people base their decisions on under such environmental uncertainty (i.e., 
uncertainty about characteristics of the task environment of a social dilemma; Messick 
et al., 1988)? One possible answer to this question may be provided by looking at 
social dilemmas with environmental certainty as “strong” situations versus looking at 
social dilemmas with environmental uncertainty as “weak” situations.
Social Dilemmas as Strong Versus Weak Situations
 According to Snyder and Ickes (1985), an environment can create either a 
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psychologically “strong” or a psychologically “weak” situation. Strong situations have a 
high degree of structure and defi nition and therefore provide salient cues for behavior. 
Weak situations, by contrast, do not offer such cues for behavior because they are 
relatively unstructured and ambiguous. In strong situations, behavior is thus largely 
guided by the constraints of the situation, resulting in little interpersonal differences in 
people’s responses. In weak situations, on the other hand, behavior is more strongly 
infl uenced by dispositional factors, resulting in more interpersonal variation. 
Van Lange (1997; see also Roch & Samuelson, 1997) has suggested that 
this strong-weak distinction is also applicable to social dilemma situations. If we apply 
this perspective to environmental uncertainty, we can defi ne the typical experimental 
common resource dilemma as a strong situation as it provides participants with the 
clear focal point that applying the equal division rule is the most “appropriate” way to 
behave. By contrast, a common resource dilemma in which the size of the resource is 
uncertain does not provide such a clear focal point to guide behavior. As a result, the 
equal division rule may lose its coordinating potential. In such situations, we suggest 
that participants will rely more on relevant internal cues such as their dispositional 
preferences for engaging in either cooperation or non-cooperation. Therefore, we 
suggest that in common resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty, participants 
use their own social value orientations as a guideline for choice behavior.
Social Value Orientations
 Social value orientation (SVO) is a personality variable that indicates how 
people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others (Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Generally, a distinction is made between three types of 
social value orientations (e.g., Van Lange, 1999): (a) cooperation, i.e., the preference 
to maximize joint outcomes and establish an equal distribution, (b) individualism, i.e., 
the preference to maximize own outcomes, and (c) competition, i.e., the preference 
to maximize the relative advantage of own outcomes. Cooperators are commonly 
referred to as prosocials, and individualists and competitors as proselfs (e.g., Kramer, 
McClintock, & Messick, 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 
1994). In social dilemmas, prosocials generally show more cooperative behavior than 
proselfs (e.g., Kramer et al., 1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985).
However, as we have argued before, whether proselfs and prosocials behave 
differently in social dilemma situations may depend on the environmental characteristics 
of the dilemma (cf. Parks, 1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). In the typical common 
resource dilemma, it is benefi cial to both proselfs and prosocials to request an equal 
share of the resource because it furthers personal as well as collective interests. From 
this perspective it is “effi cient” as well as “fair” to adhere to the equal division rule, 
making the rule appealing to both proselfs and prosocials (see De Cremer & Van 
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Lange, 2001; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005; Van Lange, 1999). Consequently, 
we expect that under environmental certainty, the effect of SVO on individual 
requests will be constrained by the focal point to adhere to the equal division rule 
(i.e., in a “strong” social dilemma), whereas SVO will more strongly infl uence choice 
behavior under environmental uncertainty (i.e., in a “weak” social dilemma).
Based on the above, we can formulate the following hypotheses. First, 
we expect to replicate the fi nding from earlier studies (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; 
Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 1992), that under resource size uncertainty, 
people request signifi cantly more than under resource size certainty (Hypothesis 
2.1). Second, we predict an interaction between resource size uncertainty and SVO 
on individual requests. Under resource size certainty, we expect a limited difference 
between proselfs’ versus prosocials’ individual requests, whereas proselfs are expected 
to request more than prosocials under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 2.2). As in 
earlier studies on resource size uncertainty in social dilemmas, these hypotheses will be 
tested by manipulating different levels of resource size uncertainty as a within-subjects 
factor.
Resource Size Estimates
 In the present chapter, we will not focus exclusively on people’s choice behavior. 
Although not our primary aim, we will also investigate whether resource size uncertainty 
infl uences people’s estimates of the size of the resource. In agreement with fi ndings 
from earlier studies (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport 
et al., 1992), we expect that people will not only increase their individual requests 
under resource size uncertainty, but also their resource size estimates (Hypothesis 2.3). 
There are two plausible explanations for these fi ndings (Hine & Gifford, 1996).5 One 
explanation is that people try to justify their non-cooperative behavior by increasing 
their resource size estimates together with their individual requests. We will refer to this 
explanation as the egoism-justifi cation explanation. A second plausible explanation for 
this fi nding is that under environmental uncertainty, people are overoptimistic about the 
size of the resource and therefore have the tendency to give relatively high estimates. 
We will refer to this explanation as the outcome-desirability explanation. 
We will investigate the two above-mentioned explanations in an exploratory 
manner. Based on the egoism-justifi cation explanation, following the prediction that 
proselfs request more than prosocials under resource size uncertainty, we can predict 
that proselfs will also give higher resource size estimates than prosocials. In this way, 
proselfs may justify their relatively high individual requests. From this perspective, we 
5   There is a third explanation of this overestimation effect, namely, that there might be a perceptual bias in 
people’s resource size estimates. However, Gustafsson et al. (1999a, 1999b) have presented results that refute 
this possibility.
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can thus expect that under resource size uncertainty, proselfs’ resource size estimates 
will be higher than the estimates of prosocials. The outcome-desirability explanation 
would not be able to explain such a fi nding. After all, there is no reason to assume 
that people with different social value orientations differ in the extent to which they are 
optimistic about the size of the resource, especially because a large common resource 
is benefi cial to both personal and collective interests. However, in order to check 
whether SVO is related to optimism, we will also explore whether people with different 
social value orientations differ in dispositional optimism.
Study 2.1
Method
Participants and Design 
Participants were 126 students at Leiden University (42 men and 84 women, 
M age = 20.98 years) who volunteered for the study. At the beginning of the experiment 
each participant’s SVO was assessed. Subsequently, resource size uncertainty was 
manipulated as a within-subjects factor. Accordingly, a 2 (SVO: Proselfs vs. Prosocials) 
× 3 (Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. Low vs. High) factorial design was used. 
Preliminary inspection of the data showed that the individual request of one 
proself in the High Resource Uncertainty condition was more than three standard 
deviations higher than the mean request in this condition, which indicates that this 
participant was an outlier. Therefore, the data of this participant were excluded from 
analyses.6
Procedure 
The participants were invited to participate in a study on “decision making”. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory they were seated in separate cubicles, each containing a 
personal computer. This computer was used to give instructions to the participants and 
to register the dependent measures.
Assessment of Social Value Orientation
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants completed the nine-
item version of the decomposed games measure to assess their social value orientations 
(Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). The decomposed games measure has 
excellent psychometric qualities. It is internally consistent (e.g., Parks, 1994), reliable 
over substantial time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992), and is not 
6   Inclusion of this outlier did not alter the pattern of results.
Social Dilemmas as Strong versus Weak Situations 19
proefschrift_def.indd   19 07-08-2007   16:01:32
related to measures of social desirability (e.g., Platow, 1994). The task consists of nine 
items, each containing three alternative outcome distributions with points for oneself 
and an anonymous other. For each of these nine items the participants had to choose 
which of the three distributions they preferred. Each item contained a prosocial (e.g., 
self: 500, other: 500), an individualistic (e.g., self: 560, other: 300), and a competitive 
choice (e.g., self: 490, other: 90). 
Participants were classifi ed as prosocial, individualistic, or competitive when 
at least six out of nine choices were consistent with one of these three orientations 
(e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Out of 126 participants, 56 (44%) were classifi ed 
as prosocials, 47 (37%) as individualists, and 8 (6%) as competitors. Fifteen participants 
(12%) could not be classifi ed and were therefore excluded from further analyses. As 
in many earlier studies (e.g., Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), individualists and competitors were 
combined to form one group of proselfs (n = 55; 44%).
Assessment of Dispositional Optimism
After fi lling in the decomposed games measure, we asked participants to fi ll 
in a revised version of the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R), a widely-used scale with good 
psychometric properties (i.e., good predictive and discriminant validity, high internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability) that is used to measure dispositional optimism 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). After that, participants responded to some fi ller 
questionnaires. Next, they were presented with the common resource dilemma.
The Common Resource Dilemma 
Participants were informed that they were part of a group of fi ve people, that each 
group member was sitting in a separate cubicle and that there was no communication 
possible among participants. Furthermore, participants were not aware of the identity of 
their fellow group members. Decisions had to be made privately and anonymously.
The participants learned that as a group they would be presented with three 
situations. These three situations had identical task structures. In each of these situations, 
each group member could request any number of coins from a common resource. Each 
coin was worth € 0.01 (€ 1 is approximately US $ 1.65). For each of the three situations, it 
held that if the group’s collective request would be smaller than or equal to the resource size, 
the requests would be granted and each group member would earn the amount of money 
he or she had requested in that situation. However, if the group’s collective request would 
exceed the resource size in a situation, all group members would earn zero outcomes in 
that situation. During and between the three situations, no feedback was given about the 
decisions of the other group members nor about the group’s collective request.
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Manipulation of Resource Size Uncertainty
The three situations only differed in the extent to which there was uncertainty 
about the size of the common resource. Resource size uncertainty was manipulated 
by varying the range of the uniform distribution of the resource size (cf. Budescu et al., 
1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 1992). The midpoint of these ranges 
was kept constant across the three conditions, namely 500. Under No Uncertainty, 
resource size was certain, namely 500 coins (midpoint = 500, range = 0). Under 
Low Uncertainty, the resource would contain at least 400 and at most 600 coins 
(midpoint = 500, range = 200). Under High Uncertainty, the resource would contain at 
least 100 and at most 900 coins (midpoint = 500, range = 800). Participants learned 
that the exact size of the common resource in the two uncertainty conditions would 
be randomly drawn from these uniform distributions by a computer at the end of the 
experimental session (i.e., independently for each of the two uncertainty conditions). 
The three conditions were counter-balanced to check for order effects. Preliminary 
analyses revealed no signifi cant order effects on any of the dependent variables 
(all Fs < 1).
After the participants read the instructions of the common resource dilemmas, 
fi ve practice questions were posed to ensure comprehension of the three situations. 
For example, participants were asked how much group members would earn if the 
total group request would exceed the size of the common resource in one of the 
three situations. On average, each question was answered correctly by 97% of all 
participants. After each question, the correct answer was disclosed and the most 
important characteristics of the dilemmas were repeated. After that, the three situations 
were presented.
Dependent Measures 
In all three conditions, exactly the same questions were posed. In each 
condition, participants requested a number of coins from the common resource. 
Subsequently, they were asked to estimate the size of the common resource.
At the end of the experimental session, which lasted about one hour, all 
participants were debriefed, thanked and paid for their participation. In the debriefi ng, 
we explained participants that we would pay all participants the same amount of money 
for their participation (i.e., € 7.25, approximately US $ 12.00). We also explained them 
that we could not pay them according to their choice behavior because the groups they 
had been part of did not really exist. All participants agreed to this payment procedure.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
Unless stated otherwise, all analyses were performed with 2 (SVO) × 3 
(Resource Size Uncertainty) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the latter factor.
In each of the three conditions, after participants had given their resource 
size estimates, we asked them to indicate how uncertain they were about these 
estimates (1 = very certain; 7 = very uncertain). A 2 × 3 ANOVA on this measure 
only yielded a highly signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, 
F(1.94, 209.54) = 397.28, p < .0001, η2 = .79 (Huynh-Feldt correction of dfs). As 
expected, participants indicated that they were least uncertain about their estimates 
under No Uncertainty (M = 1.26), more uncertain under Low Uncertainty (M = 4.64), 
and most uncertain under High Uncertainty (M = 5.50, all ps < .05, HSD). These results 
show that we were successful in manipulating resource size uncertainty.
Individual Requests
In each of the three conditions, the participants individually requested a 
number of coins from the common resource. A 2 × 3 ANOVA on participants’ individual 
requests yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1.40, 151.14) = 
10.78, p < .001, η2 = .09, and a signifi cant SVO × Resource Size Uncertainty interaction 
effect, F(1.40, 151.14) = 3.51, p < .05, η2 = .03 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction of dfs). 
It should be noted, however, that the variances in the High Resource Size Uncertainty 
conditions were considerably larger than the variances in the No and the Low Resource 
Size Uncertainty conditions. In order to reduce this heterogeneity of variances, we 
applied a square root transformation on participants’ individual requests. After applying 
this transformation, which successfully reduced the heterogeneity of variances, a 
2 × 3 ANOVA still yielded the same signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, 
F(1.45, 156.24) = 5.52, p < .05, η2 = .05, and the same signifi cant SVO × Resource 
Size Uncertainty interaction effect, F(1.45, 156.24) = 3.49, p < .05, η2 = .03 (Huynh-
Feldt correction of dfs). The main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty indicated that 
under High Uncertainty participants requested more coins from the common resource 
(M = 142.28) than under No Uncertainty (M = 109.72) and under Low Uncertainty 
(M = 106.85). These fi ndings support Hypothesis 2.1, i.e., that under resource size 
uncertainty people request more than under resource size certainty.
To interpret the interaction effect, we tested whether the individual requests 
of proselfs differed from those of prosocials within each separate level of Resource 
Size Uncertainty (See Table 2.1). Independent t-tests showed no signifi cant differences 
between proselfs’ and prosocials’ individual requests under No Uncertainty (M = 
108.50 vs. 110.89, respectively), t(108) = .3, p = .74, nor under Low Uncertainty 
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(M = 112.69 vs. 101.21, respectively), t(108) = 1.4, p = .16. Under High Uncertainty, 
however, proselfs requested signifi cantly more coins than prosocials (M = 163.63 vs. 
121.70, respectively), t(108) = 2.1, p < .05. These results support Hypothesis 2.2, 
i.e., that under resource size uncertainty proselfs would request more coins from the 
common resource than prosocials, although it should be noted that this difference was 
only signifi cant under High Uncertainty.
Table 2.1. Individual Requests by Social Value Orientation and Resource Size Uncertainty (2 × 3)
Social Value Orientation Resource Size Uncertainty
No Low High














Note. Higher scores denote higher individual requests. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Resource Size Estimates
After participants had made their individual requests, they were asked to 
estimate the size of the resource. The No Uncertainty condition was excluded from 
the analysis of these estimates. After all, in this condition, participants knew the exact 
size of the common resource with certainty. A 2 (SVO) × 2 (Resource Size Uncertainty: 
Low vs. High) ANOVA on participants’ resource size estimates yielded a signifi cant 
main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 108) = 8.73, p < .01, η2 = .08, and a 
signifi cant main effect of SVO, F(1, 108) = 4.66, p < .05, η2 = .04. In agreement with the 
egoism-justifi cation explanation, the main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty indicates 
that participants gave signifi cantly higher estimates of the resource size under High 
Uncertainty (M = 554.77) than under Low Uncertainty (M = 482.61).
As an additional test of the egoism-justifi cation explanation, we tested whether 
the resource size estimates of proselfs were higher than those of prosocials in each 
separate level of resource size uncertainty (See Table 2.2). Independent t-tests showed 
that proselfs gave signifi cantly higher resource size estimates than prosocials under 
Low Uncertainty (M = 498.15 vs. 469.73, respectively), t(108) = 2.46, p = .05, as well 
as under High Uncertainty (M = 592.59 vs. 511.96, respectively), t(108) = 1.71, p = .05 
(one-sided). Taken together, these results support the egoism-justifi cation explanation.
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Table 2.2. Resource Size Estimates by Social Value Orientation and Resource Size Uncertainty (2 × 2)
Social Value Orientation Resource Size Uncertainty











Note. Higher scores denote higher resource size estimates. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
SVO and Dispositional Optimism
 Proselfs and prosocials did not differ signifi cantly in their scores on the LOT-
R (M = 4.60 vs. 4.71, respectively), t(108) = .65, p = .52, which indicates that people 
differing in SVO do not differ in dispositional optimism. Additionally, no signifi cant 
relations were found between participants’ dispositional optimism and any of the 
dependent variables (all absolute rs < .13, all ps > .17).
Application of the Equal Division Rule
 To assess to what degree participants anchored their decisions on the equal 
division rule in the different Resource Size Uncertainty conditions, we investigated to 
what extent their individual requests deviated from an equal share of their own resource 
size estimates. To do so, we calculated the absolute difference between participants’ 
individual requests and an equal share of their own resource size estimates. A 2 × 3 
ANOVA on this calculated deviation only yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource 
Size Uncertainty, F(1.63, 176.23) = 6.04, p < .001, η2 = .08 (Huynh-Feldt correction of 
dfs), indicating that participants’ requests deviated signifi cantly more from an equal 
share under High Uncertainty (M = 44.75) than under No Uncertainty (M = 13.03; 
p < .05, HSD) and under Low Uncertainty (M = 14.25; p < .05, HSD). Closer inspection 
of these data showed that participants mostly deviated in the direction of harvesting 
more than an equal share.7 Further, additional analyses showed that with increasing 
resource size uncertainty, a smaller proportion of the participants requested exactly an 
equal share of their own resource size estimates (80% vs. 71% vs. 51%, respectively), 
χ2(4, N = 110) = 33.00, p < .001. Taken together, these results suggest that with 
increasing resource size uncertainty, people are less inclined to anchor their decisions 
on the equal division rule.
7 To check in which direction participants’ requests deviated from the equal division rule, we divided their 
requests by their own resource size estimates. Additional analyses on this calculated proportion showed that, 
on average, participants requested signifi cantly more than an equal share of their own resource size estimates 
in each of the three Resource Size Uncertainty conditions (all ts > 2.7, all ps < .01).
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Discussion
In this chapter, we focused on environmental uncertainty in common resource 
dilemmas. We showed that under resource size certainty (i.e., in a “strong” social 
dilemma), people anchor their decisions on the equal division rule,8 whereas they base 
their decisions on their own social value orientations under resource size uncertainty 
(i.e., in a “weak” social dilemma). On a more general level, Study 2.1 generates new 
insights into the relation between social uncertainty and environmental uncertainty by 
showing that the way in which people deal with social uncertainty is affected by the 
uncertainty people may experience regarding environmental information (cf. Van Dijk 
et al., 1999). Our fi ndings indicate that in situations of environmental certainty, people 
may adequately deal with social uncertainty by focusing on environmental cues (e.g., 
the size of the resource) and by using these environmental cues to apply the equal 
division rule. However, when such environmental cues are absent or ambiguous, the 
environment loses its coordinating potential (cf. Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & Budescu, 2004; 
see Wit & Wilke, 1998, for a similar argument in public goods dilemmas). 
A closer inspection of our data provided additional support for this line of 
reasoning. When we compared people’s individual requests with their own resource 
size estimates, their requests appeared to deviate more from an equal share under 
resource size uncertainty than under resource size certainty. As expected, these results 
suggest that under resource size uncertainty, people are less inclined to anchor their 
decisions on the equal division rule. In such situations, people rely more on relevant 
internal cues (i.e., their SVO) to determine their choice behavior.
At this point, it might be interesting to compare our results with fi ndings 
reported by Roch and Samuelson (1997), who studied how people’s reactions to 
a declining common resource were affected by replenishment rate uncertainty (i.e., 
uncertainty regarding the regenerating capacity of the resource). The results showed 
that prosocials versus proselfs did not react differently in the fi rst phase (i.e., when the 
common resource was abundant) and the last phase (i.e., when the common resource 
was almost completely depleted) of the experimental trials. Only in the middle trials, an 
interaction between replenishment rate uncertainty and SVO on cooperation emerged: 
under replenishment rate uncertainty, proselfs harvested more than prosocials. In their 
discussion of this unexpected pattern of results, Roch and Samuelson suggested that 
the interaction between replenishment rate uncertainty and SVO might only emerge in 
the temporal dynamics of a social dilemma, i.e., after group members have become 
acquainted with the gradual decline of the resource. The present study, however, 
8  A large majority of the participants (i.e., 80%) harvested an equal share under No Uncertainty. Not surprisingly, 
most of the participants who did deviate from an equal share, harvested more (rather than less) than an equal 
share. As a consequence, under No Uncertainty, the mean harvest was slightly higher than 100 coins.
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in which we introduced resource size uncertainty in a single-trial common resource 
dilemma, suggests a more pervasive and eminent role of SVO in how people deal with 
environmental uncertainty. Moreover, our additional analysis, that assessed participants’ 
adherence to the equal division rule, reveals that the infl uence of environmental 
uncertainty can best be understood by acknowledging its possible detrimental effects 
for tacit coordination.
Although not our primary interest, we also investigated the egoism-justifi cation 
and the outcome-desirability explanations in an exploratory manner. A possible 
limitation of our study is that the procedure of fi rst eliciting harvesting decisions and 
after that asking for resource size estimates may have facilitated the use of resource 
size estimates as a justifi cation for behavior and may therefore not provide a stringent 
comparative test of the two explanations. Nevertheless, the obtained results seem 
to be in accordance with the egoism-justifi cation explanation. Not only did proselfs 
request more coins from the common resource under resource size uncertainty, they 
also gave higher resource size estimates. Furthermore, SVO appeared to be unrelated 
to dispositional optimism. Altogether, these results suggest that, under environmental 
uncertainty, proselfs justify their “greedy” behavior by increasing their resource size 
estimates.9 In this way, resource size uncertainty provides proselfs with a convenient 
“excuse” for being selfi sh, thereby coloring their estimates with self-interest (cf. Hine & 
Gifford, 1996).
In a series of studies on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas, 
Gustafsson et al. (1999a, 1999b) also investigated the egoism-justifi cation explanation 
and the outcome-desirability explanation. These studies showed that participants not 
only over-harvest from an uncertain common resource, but even from an uncertain 
private resource (i.e., a situation in which an individual [instead of a group] owns a 
resource with an uncertain size). As Gustafsson et al. noted, this latter fi nding cannot 
be explained by the egoism-justifi cation explanation, whereas it can be explained 
by the outcome-desirability explanation. However, as Gustafsson et al. (1999a) also 
pointed out, it is important to note that the different mechanisms described by these 
two explanations are not mutually exclusive, and that both mechanisms might be 
operative under resource size uncertainty. Consequently, the support Gustafsson et al. 
found for the outcome-desirability explanation does not necessarily falsify the egoism-
justifi cation explanation. Likewise, our present support for the egoism-justifi cation 
explanation does not rule out the outcome-desirability explanation. 
9  Interestingly, proselfs did not seem to use the equal division rule in justifying their harvests under uncertainty, 
i.e., they did not increase their resource size estimates to such an extent that their harvests would amount to 
one-fi fth of these estimates.
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In conclusion, by looking at social dilemmas as “weak” versus “strong” 
situations, the present study sheds a new light on the topic of environmental uncertainty 
in social dilemmas. In “strong” social dilemmas, people anchor their decisions on 
(tacit) coordination rules. However, to determine their choice behavior in “weak” social 
dilemmas, people rely more on their own social value orientations.
Social Dilemmas as Strong versus Weak Situations 27
proefschrift_def.indd   27 07-08-2007   16:01:36
28 Chapter 3
Group size uncertainty
proefschrift_def.indd   28 07-08-2007   16:01:36
Chapter 3
Group Size Uncertainty10
Social dilemmas are situations in which people face a confl ict between their 
personal interests (called defection) and the interests of their group (called cooperation). 
In such dilemmas, people thus have to choose whether to defect or to cooperate. A 
choice to defect yields the best payoff to individual group members (i.e., in at least 
one of the possible outcome confi gurations; Liebrand & Messick, 1996), whereas all 
individual group members are better off if all cooperate than if all defect (see Komorita 
& Parks, 1995; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002, for reviews).
A well-known type of social dilemma is the common resource dilemma (or 
commons dilemma). In this type of social dilemma, a group of people have access 
to a limited common resource. A real-life example of such a resource dilemma is the 
environmental problem of over-fi shing. In this resource dilemma, a group of fi shermen 
have access to a natural common resource, namely the fi sh population. When 
individual fi shermen choose to further their self-interest by catching as much fi sh as 
they can, the collective interest is jeopardized because excessive fi shing increases the 
chance of the resource becoming depleted. So whereas individual fi shermen may be 
tempted to overuse the common resource, the collective interest calls for moderate 
use. Moreover, to further complicate matters, fi shermen often do not know how large 
the fi sh population is or how many fi shermen are fi shing from the same pool (Ostrom, 
1990; Takigawa & Messick, 1993).
Many real-life social dilemmas are thus characterized by environmental 
uncertainty, or uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the task environment of a 
social dilemma (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). Earlier research has shown that 
environmental uncertainty can have a large impact on people’s choice behavior. For 
instance, earlier studies have repeatedly shown that uncertainty regarding the size of 
the resource (i.e., resource size uncertainty) leads to over-harvesting (e.g., Budescu, 
Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 2006; 
Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999a; Hine & Gifford, 1996; see Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & 
Budescu, 2004, for an overview of the effects of uncertainty). However, until now very 
little experimental research has been done to investigate other types of environmental 
uncertainty, such as uncertainty about the number of group members sharing a 
resource (see Au & Ngai, 2003, for an exception).
In real life, group sizes are often uncertain. In many social dilemma situations, 
people do not know precisely how many group members there are. For instance, water 
10  This chapter is based on De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit and De Cremer (conditionally accepted).
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consumers often do not know how many people are consuming water in their water 
district (see Ostrom, 1990; Takigawa & Messick, 1993, for numerous other real-life 
examples). Therefore, more experimental research is needed to obtain more insight into 
this type of environmental uncertainty (Van Dijk et al., 2004). In the present research, 
we will investigate how group size uncertainty infl uences choice behavior in common 
resource dilemmas.
Earlier Research on Group Size Uncertainty
 To our knowledge, only one experimental study has been conducted to 
investigate group size uncertainty in social dilemmas. In an earlier study, Au and Ngai 
(2003) investigated the effects of group size uncertainty in a single choice step-level 
common resource dilemma under different protocols of play. Each of their  participants 
made only one harvesting decision in a series of successive rounds, either in a pre-
specifi ed order (called a sequential protocol) or whenever (s)he decided to do so (called 
a self-paced protocol). Overuse of the common resource would destroy its value and 
none of the harvests would be granted. In the group size certainty condition, participants 
were told that the group size was fi ve. In the group size uncertainty condition, they 
were told that their group was equally likely to be any size between three and seven 
persons. In all conditions, after the fi rst round participants were fully informed about the 
combined harvests of all the preceding players in the sequence, but in the self-paced 
protocol participants were also informed about the number of players who had made 
requests in the previous round. 
The authors were primarily interested in effects on total requests, i.e., effects 
at the collective level. Their analyses showed that collective overuse was less likely to 
occur under group size uncertainty than under group size certainty. Under group size 
uncertainty, participants apparently acted as if the group size was large and requested 
less, to avoid collective overuse. Ancillary analyses showed that in the self-paced protocol 
of play, group size uncertainty resulted in participants delaying their harvest decision to 
a later round until they knew the combined harvests of all the preceding players in the 
sequence, reducing the risk of collective overuse. By contrast, participants who were 
certain that the group size was fi ve did not wait and were more likely to make a request 
in the fi rst round. Given that they – on average – requested somewhat more than their 
equal share (i.e., 1/5th of the common resource) the pool was more likely to be overused 
under group size certainty than under group size uncertainty. It may be suggested that 
the self-paced protocol allowed participants to coordinate their actions. Under group 
size uncertainty, a participant could gain useful information about the number and the 
(combined) size of others’ requests by delaying his or her own harvest decision to a later 
round. This raises the question as to what will happen if uncertainty about the number 
and size of other’s requests cannot be reduced by strategic timing of one’s decisions. 
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In order to disentangle the effects of group size uncertainty on the size and 
on the timing of participants’ harvests, the present study uses a simultaneous protocol 
of play, in which participants will not be informed about the harvests of their fellow 
group members. By doing so, we can obtain more insight into the inhibiting effects of 
group size uncertainty on tacit coordination. Moreover, to answer the question as to 
how people make decisions when the possibility for tacit coordination is limited, we 
draw on Snyder and Ickes’ (1985) framework of strong versus weak situations. On 
the basis of this conceptual framework, we will argue and demonstrate that under 
group size uncertainty people base their harvesting decisions on their own social value 
orientations.
Tacit Coordination and Group Size Uncertainty as a Weak Situation
In social dilemmas such as the one described above, it is important for people 
to coordinate their choice behavior effectively (e.g., Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006; Van 
Dijk & Wilke, 1996). In resource dilemmas, it is best for people to coordinate their 
decisions in such a way that the collective resource does not become depleted, which 
would be detrimental to individual as well as collective interests. However, effective 
coordination is hampered when group members do not know what their fellow group 
members will decide. This uncertainty about the decisions of other group members is 
called social uncertainty (or strategic uncertainty, Messick et al., 1988). Earlier research 
has shown that people can often deal with such social uncertainty by means of tacit 
coordination (Schelling, 1960; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1996). That is, group members can 
predict their fellow group members’ decisions by using so-called tacit coordination 
rules (such as the equal division rule; see also Allison & Messick, 1990). Furthermore, 
people also use such coordination rules to determine their own choice behavior.
Imagine a resource dilemma with the same payoff structure as to the one Au 
and Ngai used (2003). In this dilemma, a group of fi ve people own a collective resource 
of 500 coins. Each individual group member can request a number of coins from this 
resource. However, if the total group request exceeds the number of coins available in 
the collective resource, the resource becomes depleted and no-one receives any coins. 
The fi ve group members cannot communicate with one another and do not know what 
their fellow group members will decide (i.e., social uncertainty). Research has shown 
that people tend to solve this social dilemma by using a tacit coordination rule, in this 
case the equal division rule. In other words, most group members will request an equal 
share from the collective resource (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990), in this case 100 
coins. If all group members decide to do so the resource is optimally used and all group 
members receive 100 coins. Thus, under uncertainty in a resource dilemma, people 
can tacitly coordinate their decisions by applying the equal division rule.
 In order to apply the equal division rule, however, people need specifi c and 
Group Size Uncertainty 31
proefschrift_def.indd   31 07-08-2007   16:01:37
accurate information about the task environment of a social dilemma. To calculate an 
equal share people have to divide the size of the collective resource by the number of 
group members. In order to do so, they need to know exactly how large the resource 
is and how many people the group consists of. Thus, when the group size is uncertain 
it becomes much more diffi cult for group members to apply the equal division rule. So 
what do people base their decisions on under such group size uncertainty?
 The answer to this question may be found in Snyder and Ickes’ framework of 
weak versus strong situations (1985; see also Roch & Samuelson, 1997; Van Lange, 
1997). Snyder and Ickes distinguish two types of situations. Strong situations are 
situations that provide salient cues for people to base their decisions on. In strong 
situations, people base their decisions on these salient environmental cues. As a result, 
strong situations lead to little interpersonal variation in their decisions. Weak situations, 
by contrast, do not provide people with such salient environmental cues. In weak 
situations, people cannot use external cues to base their decisions on, but they base 
their decisions on their own dispositional preferences.
When we apply this framework to group size (un)certainty in social dilemmas, 
we can characterize social dilemmas with group size certainty as strong situations. After 
all, under group size certainty most people may decide to base their choice behavior 
on the equal division rule.  By contrast, social dilemmas with group size uncertainty 
can be characterized as weak situations that do not provide people with the salient 
cues to apply the equal division rule. Under group size uncertainty, we can therefore 
expect people to base their decisions on their own dispositional preference for either 
cooperation or non-cooperation, i.e., their social value orientation.
Social value orientation (SVO) is a personality variable that indicates how 
people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others (Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Generally, a distinction is made between three types of 
social value orientations (e.g., Van Lange, 1999): (a) cooperation, i.e., the preference 
to maximize joint outcomes and establish an equal distribution, (b) individualism, i.e., 
the preference to maximize own outcomes, and (c) competition, i.e., the preference to 
maximize the relative advantage of own outcomes. Cooperators are commonly referred 
to as prosocials, and individualists and competitors as proselfs. In social dilemmas, 
prosocials generally show more cooperative behavior than proselfs (e.g., Kramer, 
McClintock, & Messick, 1986).
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Study 3.1
Hypotheses
Based on the above, we can formulate the following hypotheses. First, we 
predict an interaction between group size uncertainty and SVO on individual requests. 
Under group size certainty (i.e., a strong situation), we expect that proselfs as well as 
prosocials will base their harvesting decisions on the equal division rule and therefore 
we predict a limited difference between proselfs’ and prosocials’ individual requests 
(Hypothesis 3.1). Under group size uncertainty (i.e., a weak situation), by contrast, we 
expect that participants will base their decisions on their own social value orientation, 
and therefore we predict a (signifi cant) difference between the individual requests of 
proselfs versus prosocials, i.e., prosocials’ requests being lower than those of proselfs 
(Hypothesis 3.2).
Second, although not our primary aim, besides testing hypotheses about 
people’s individual harvests, we will also test whether proselfs and prosocials differ in 
their estimates of the size of their group. Earlier research on resource size uncertainty 
(e.g., De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006) has shown that proselfs and prosocials give different 
estimates of the size of an uncertain common resource. That is, earlier fi ndings showed 
that proselfs - besides harvesting larger amounts than prosocials - also gave higher 
estimates of the size of the common resource than prosocials. When we generalize 
this fi nding to group size uncertainty, we can expect group size estimates also to be 
affected by social value orientations: Prosocials will give higher estimates of the size of 
the group than proselfs (i.e., when the group is large there are less resources available 
per group member; Hypothesis 3.3).11
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 120 students at Leiden University (15 men and 105 women, 
M age = 20.80 years) who volunteered for the study. At the beginning of the experiment 
each participant’s SVO was assessed. Group size uncertainty was manipulated as a within-
subjects factor. Accordingly, a 2 (SVO: Proselfs vs. Prosocials) × 2 (Group Size Uncertainty: 
No vs. Yes) factorial design with repeated measures on the latter factor was used. 
11  Another possibility is that people are over-optimistic about the size of the group under group size uncertainty 
(i.e., the outcome-desirability explanation; cf. Gustafsson et al., 1999). If this is the case, we can expect that 
people will give relatively low group size estimates. However, this explanation would not predict a difference 
between the group size estimates of proselfs versus prosocials, also because earlier research has shown that 
proselfs and prosocials do not differ in dispositional optimism (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006).
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Procedure 
The participants were invited to participate in a study on “group decision
making”. Upon arrival at the laboratory they were seated in separate cubicles, each 
containing a personal computer. This computer was used to give instructions to the 
participants and to register the dependent measures.
Assessment of Social Value Orientation
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants completed the 
nine-item version of the decomposed games measure to assess their social value 
orientations (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). The decomposed games 
measure has excellent psychometric qualities. It is internally consistent (e.g., Parks, 
1994), reliable over substantial time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992), 
and not related to measures of social desirability (e.g., Platow, 1994). The task consists 
of nine items, each containing three alternative outcome distributions with points 
for oneself and an anonymous other. For each of these nine items the participants 
had to choose which of the three distributions they preferred. Each item contained a 
prosocial (e.g., self: 500, other: 500), an individualistic (e.g., self: 560, other: 300), and 
a competitive option (e.g., self: 490, other: 90). 
Participants were classifi ed as prosocial, individualistic, or competitive when 
at least six out of nine choices were consistent with one of these three orientations 
(e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Out of 120 participants, 54 (45%) were classifi ed 
as prosocials, 40 (33%) as individualists, and 12 (10%) as competitors. Fourteen 
participants (12%) could not be classifi ed and were therefore excluded from further 
analyses. As in many earlier studies (e.g., Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; 
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), individualists and 
competitors were combined to form one group of proselfs (n = 52; 43%). After 
completing the SVO measure, participants responded to some fi ller questionnaires. 
Next, they were presented with the resource dilemma.
The Resource Dilemma 
Participants were informed that they would be part of a group of people, 
that each group member was sitting in a separate cubicle and that there was no 
communication possible among participants. Furthermore, participants were not aware 
of the identity of their fellow group members. Decisions had to be made privately and 
anonymously.
The participants were presented with two similar resource dilemmas that 
only differed in the degree of group size uncertainty. Participants learned that at the 
end of the experimental session a computer would randomly select one of these two 
situations and that this selected situation would be used to calculate the amount of 
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money each individual group member would earn. Each of these two situations was 
thus an independent single-trial resource dilemma. 
In each of these resource dilemmas, each group member could request any 
number of coins from a collective resource of 500 coins. Each coin was worth € 0.01 
(€ 1 was approximately US $ 1.65). For each of these resource dilemmas it held that if 
the group’s collective request would be smaller than or equal to the resource size, the 
requests would be granted and each group member would earn the amount of money 
he or she had requested in that situation. However, if the group’s collective request 
would exceed the resource size all group members would earn zero outcomes. This 
resource dilemma is similar to the one used by Au and Ngai (2003) but in the present 
study participants had to make their decisions simultaneously. Moreover, during and 
between the two resource dilemmas no feedback was given about the decisions of the 
other group members nor about the group’s collective request.
Manipulation of Group Size Uncertainty
The two situations only differed in the degree of uncertainty about the size of 
the group. Group size uncertainty was manipulated by varying the range of the uniform 
distribution of the group size. The midpoint of these ranges was kept constant across 
the two conditions, namely fi ve. Under No Uncertainty, the group size was certain, 
namely fi ve group members (midpoint = 5, range = 0). Under Uncertainty, the group 
would consist of at least two and at most eight group members (midpoint = 5, range 
= 6). Participants learned that the exact size of the group in the uncertainty condition 
would be randomly drawn from these uniform distributions by a computer at the end 
of the experimental session (i.e., participants were told that their group was equally 
likely to be any size between two and eight persons). The two conditions were counter-
balanced to check for order effects. Preliminary analyses revealed no signifi cant order 
effects on any of the dependent variables (all Fs < 1).
After the participants had read the instructions of the resource dilemmas, 
three practice questions were posed to ensure comprehension of these dilemmas. For 
example, participants were asked how much each group member would earn if the 
total group request would exceed the size of the collective resource. Ninety-nine % of 
all participants answered all three questions correctly. After each question the correct 
answer was disclosed and the most important characteristics of the dilemmas were 
repeated. After that, the two dilemmas were presented.
Dependent Measures 
In both (un)certainty conditions, exactly the same questions were posed. In 
each condition, participants requested a number of coins from the common resource 
and they were asked to estimate the size of the group.
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At the end of the experimental session, which lasted about half an hour, all 
participants were debriefed, thanked and paid for their participation. In the debriefi ng, 
we explained that we would pay all participants the same amount of money for their 
participation, namely € 6 (i.e., approximately US $ 10), plus the extra money they 




Unless stated otherwise, all analyses were performed with 2 (SVO) × 2 (Group 
Size Uncertainty) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the latter factor.
In each of the two conditions, we asked participants to indicate how uncertain 
they were about the size of the group (1 = very certain; 7 = very uncertain). A 2 × 2 
ANOVA on this measure only yielded a highly signifi cant main effect of Group Size 
Uncertainty, F(1, 104) = 2417.61, p < .0001, η2 = .96. As expected, participants 
were more uncertain about their estimates under Group Size Uncertainty (M = 6.25) 
than under No Group Size Uncertainty (M = 1.10). These results show that we were 
successful in manipulating group size uncertainty.
Individual Requests
In each of the two conditions, the participants individually requested a number 
of coins from the common resource (See Table 3.1). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants’ 
individual requests yielded a signifi cant main effect of SVO, F(1, 104) = 5.07, 
p < .05, η2 = .05, which was qualifi ed by a signifi cant SVO × Group Size Uncertainty 
interaction effect, F(1, 104) = 6.18, p < .05, η2 = .06. It should be noted, however, 
that in accordance with our expectations, the variance in the Group Size Uncertainty 
condition was considerably larger than the variance in the No Group Size Uncertainty 
condition. In order to reduce this heterogeneity of variances, we applied a square root 
transformation on participants’ individual requests in all conditions. After applying this 
transformation, which successfully reduced the heterogeneity of variances, a 2 × 2 
ANOVA still yielded a signifi cant main effect of SVO, F(1, 104) = 4.93, p < .05, η2 = .05, 
and a signifi cant SVO × Group Size Uncertainty interaction effect, F(1, 104) = 7.01, 
p < .01, η2 = .06, as well as a signifi cant main effect of Group Size Uncertainty, F(1, 104) 
= 8.32, p < .01, η2 = .07, which was also qualifi ed by the interaction.
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Note. Higher scores denote higher individual requests. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
To interpret the interaction effect, we tested whether the individual requests of 
proselfs differed from those of prosocials in each condition of Group Size Uncertainty. 
In accordance with Hypothesis 3.1, independent t-tests on the individual requests 
showed no signifi cant difference between proselfs and prosocials under No Uncertainty 
(M = 95.15 vs. 95.26, respectively), t(104) = 0.02, p = .98. Under Uncertainty, however, 
prosocials requested signifi cantly lower amounts of coins than proselfs (M = 100.25 vs. 
73.17, respectively), t(104) = 2.55, p < .01. This latter fi nding corroborates Hypothesis 
3.2.
Further, we also looked at the effect of group size uncertainty for proselfs 
and prosocials separately. To do so, we conducted two separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs (i.e., one for each SVO) with Group Size Uncertainty as the independent 
variable (i.e., No vs. Yes) and individual requests as the dependent variable. These 
analyses showed that the requests of proselfs did not differ signifi cantly between 
the two uncertainty conditions, F(1, 51) = .27, p = .61, η2 = .01, whereas prosocials 
requested signifi cantly lower amounts of coins in the Uncertainty condition than in 
the No Uncertainty condition, F(1, 53) = 18.44, p < .001, η2 = .26.12 Thus, prosocials 
respond more strongly to group size uncertainty than proselfs. We will elaborate on this 
fi nding in the discussion.
Group Size Estimates
After participants had made their individual requests, they were asked to 
estimate the size of the group (See Table 3.2). The No Uncertainty condition was 
excluded from the analysis of these estimates. After all, in this condition, participants 
knew the exact size of the group with certainty. An ANOVA on participants’ group size 
estimates under Uncertainty yielded a signifi cant effect of SVO, F(1, 103) = 8.14, p < 
.01, η2 = .07. In accordance with Hypothesis 3.3, prosocials gave signifi cantly higher 
estimates of the group size than proselfs (M = 6.26 vs. 5.37, respectively).
12  These analyses were also done on proselfs’ and prosocials’ transformed requests (i.e., transformed by 
applying square root transformations), which yielded the same results.
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Table 3.2. Group Size Estimates by Social Value Orientation under Group Size Uncertainty
Social Value Orientation Group Size Uncertainty
Proselfs (n = 52)
5.37
(1.60)
Prosocials (n = 54)
6.26
(1.63)
Note. Higher scores denote higher group size estimates. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The Relation between Individual Requests and Group Size Estimates
To investigate the relationship between individual requests and group size 
estimates, we looked at the correlations between participants’ individual requests and 
their group size estimates. These analyses showed that there was a highly signifi cant 
negative relation between their requests and their estimates, which was similar 
for proselfs and prosocials (both rs < -.61, both ps < .001). Thus, participants who 
requested less from the common resource made higher group size estimates. 
Additionally, to assess to what degree participants anchored their decisions 
on the equal division rule in the two Group Size (Un)certainty conditions, we investigated 
to what extent their individual requests deviated from an equal share. In the Uncertainty 
condition we calculated this equal share by dividing the resource size (i.e., 500 coins) 
by the participants’ own group size estimates. After that, we calculated the absolute 
difference between participants’ individual requests and this equal share (for a similar 
procedure to assess adherence to coordination rules, see e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the deviation scores only yielded a signifi cant main effect of Group 
Size Uncertainty, F(1, 103) = 8.12, p < .01, η2 = .07: Participants’ requests deviated 
signifi cantly more from an equal share under Group Size Uncertainty (M = 18.05) than 
under No Group Size Uncertainty (M = 7.98). This fi nding further corroborates our 
reasoning that under group size uncertainty people anchor their decisions less strongly 
on the equal division rule than under group size certainty.
Discussion
In the present chapter, we investigated the infl uence of group size uncertainty 
and SVO in social dilemmas. First, we showed that under group size uncertainty, 
people may harvest less for themselves than under group size certainty. Second, we 
showed that that group size uncertainty has important consequences for how people 
tacitly coordinate their behavior. Under group size certainty, people can effectively 
coordinate their behavior by applying the equal division rule. By contrast, under group 
size uncertainty tacit coordination is hampered because the task environment does not 
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provide people with the salient cues to apply the equal division rule. In that case, people 
rely on internal cues (i.e., their SVO) to determine their harvesting decisions.
Thus, on the one hand our results show that group size uncertainty hampers 
effective coordination. At the same time, however, our results corroborate and extend 
Au and Ngai’s (2003) fi ndings by showing that group size uncertainty is not necessarily 
detrimental to collective interests, even when people make their harvesting decisions 
simultaneously (and they cannot know their fellow group members’ decisions). 
Interestingly, whereas earlier research has shown that uncertainty about the size of the 
common resource leads to non-cooperative behavior, the present fi ndings indicate that 
uncertainty about the size of the group may lead to more cooperation. Thus, not all 
types of environmental uncertainty necessarily lead to non-cooperative behavior. But 
why may group size uncertainty lead to cooperation? Two possible explanations may 
be derived from earlier research.
Au and Ngai (2003) suggested that group size uncertainty may lead to 
cooperation because lower harvests have a higher expected utility. In an appendix to 
their paper (i.e., Appendix B), they calculated the rational strategy under group size 
uncertainty, suggesting that individual requests should decrease as the size of the 
group becomes more uncertain. A group member’s expected utility is largest when 
he/she determines his/her harvesting decision based on the largest possible group 
size (assuming that all group members use the equal division rule). In other words, if 
group members want to maximize their own payoffs, it is best for them to determine 
their individual harvests by dividing the common resource by the largest group size 
possible.
Suleiman, Rapoport and Budescu (1996) suggested that people tend to 
perceive the variability and central tendency (i.e., the mean) of probability distributions 
to be positively correlated. In other words, when faced with probability distributions 
with higher levels of variability, people are perceptually biased towards overestimating 
the central tendency (mean) of these distributions (see also Gustafsson et al., 1999a). 
Suleiman and colleagues used this perceptual bias to explain why people overestimate 
the size of an uncertain common resource. In the present study, this perceptual bias 
may explain why people overestimate the uncertain group size. Whereas overestimation 
of the size of an uncertain common resource leads to over-harvesting, overestimation 
of the size of the group leads to relatively low individual harvests. After all, when there 
are more group members there are fewer coins available per group member. 
Note, however, that the observed effect of group size uncertainty in our study 
was particularly due to prosocials’ self-restraint. This raises the question as to whether 
the above explanations can also explain why prosocials respond more strongly to 
group size uncertainty than proselfs. At fi rst glance, there seems to be no reason to 
assume that the above-mentioned two explanations are more applicable to prosocials 
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than to proselfs. However, what our data as well as these two explanations do imply 
is that group size uncertainty may induce a drive towards self-restraint. When group 
size uncertainty induces such a drive, it is plausible that prosocials will respond more 
strongly to this drive than proselfs. After all, this drive is in line with the dispositional 
preference of prosocials to cooperate. Thus, based on this line of reasoning it seems 
plausible that prosocials are more affected by group size uncertainty than proselfs.
For the current purposes, it is especially worthwhile to acknowledge the fact 
that the data provide fi rm support for the suggestion that Snyder and Ickes’ (1985) 
weak-strong distinction is highly applicable to social dilemma situations (see also Van 
Lange, 1997; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). In the present research, we showed that 
when the task environment of a social dilemma provides a salient cue to guide behavior, 
people will base their decisions on that cue (e.g., the equal division rule under group 
size certainty), whereas they will base their decisions on their own disposition when 
the task environment does not provide such a cue (e.g., their SVO under group size 
uncertainty). These fi ndings thus clearly show that Snyder and Ickes’ framework (1985; 
see also Van Lange, 1997; Roch & Samuelson, 1997) on strong vs. weak situations can 
be fruitfully used to explain and predict choice behavior in social dilemmas.
Although not our primary focus, we also investigated people’s estimates of 
the size of their group (i.e., their group size estimates). In accordance with Hypothesis 
3.3, we found that prosocials did not only harvest less than proselfs under group size 
uncertainty, but that they also gave higher estimates of the size of the group. These 
fi ndings can be related to fi ndings from an earlier study on resource size uncertainty 
(De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006), in which it was found that proselfs not only harvested 
more from an uncertain common resource than prosocials, but also gave higher 
resource size estimates. These earlier fi ndings suggest that proselfs tried to justify their 
relatively high harvests by means of their own estimates of the size of the resource 
(called egoism-justifi cation, see also Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Hine & Gifford, 1996). 
In other words, they might have justifi ed their “egoistic” behavior by reasoning: “I may 
have harvested a lot but I just thought that there were a lot of coins in the collective 
resource.” In the present study, however, it may be less appropriate to speak about 
egoism-justifi cation. Namely, we found that under group size uncertainty people do not 
show over-harvesting and therefore they do not have to justify their “egoistic” behavior 
by means of their group size estimates. What our data do show is that people who 
harvest relatively small amounts give relatively high group size estimates, inducing 
prosocials to give higher estimates than proselfs.
In an additional analysis, we took a closer look at the relationship between 
participants’ group size estimates and their individual requests. In this analysis, we 
looked at participants’ (absolute) deviations from an equal share. Under group size 
uncertainty we calculated this equal share by dividing the resource size (i.e., 500 
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coins) by the participants’ own group size estimates. When we compared participants’ 
individual requests with this equal share, their requests appeared to deviate more from 
an equal share under group size uncertainty than under group size certainty. These 
results further corroborate our idea that under group size uncertainty people are 
less inclined to base their decisions on the equal division rule than under group size 
certainty.
To summarize, the present study has generated a number of interesting 
fi ndings. First, we showed that group size uncertainty may induce people to show more 
self-restraint and that this type of uncertainty is not detrimental to collective interests. 
Second, we showed that group size uncertainty hampers effective coordination, inducing 
people to base their decisions on internal cues (i.e., their SVO) instead of external ones 
(i.e., the equal division rule), which corroborates the suggestion that Snyder and Ickes’ 
(1985) weak-strong distinction can fruitfully be applied to social dilemmas. Third, we 
showed that prosocials respond more strongly to group size uncertainty than proselfs, 
inducing prosocials to lower their harvests and to make higher group size estimates 
under uncertainty. Taken together, by investigating the topic of group size (un)certainty in 
social dilemmas and relating this topic to tacit coordination and social value orientation, 
the present study has generated a number of new insights into this largely unexplored 
type of environmental uncertainty.
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Chapter 4
Justifying Decisions in Social 
Dilemmas13
In many real-life situations, people face a confl ict between their personal 
interests and the interests of their group. Such situations, in which people have to 
choose between furthering their personal interests (often called defection) or furthering 
the interests of their group (often called cooperation), are generally referred to as 
social dilemmas. A well-known type of social dilemma, called the resource dilemma, 
concerns the problem of maintaining scarce common resources, such as energy, fi sh, 
oil or water. Whereas people may further their self-interest by harvesting excessively 
from these resources, such resources should be consumed wisely and sparingly to 
prevent depletion.
Many experimental studies have investigated decision-making in social 
dilemmas (for overviews, see e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1995; Weber, Kopelman, & 
Messick, 2004). In these studies, it was repeatedly shown that people base their 
decisions on division rules. For instance, in symmetric resource dilemmas – which 
are dilemmas in which group members have equal interests in the common resource 
– most people base their harvesting decisions on the equal division rule (e.g., Allison, 
McQueen, & Schaerfl , 1992; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). 
That is, when a resource is owned by a group of fi ve people most group members will 
decide to harvest an equal share (i.e., one-fi fth) from that resource.
According to Messick (1993), equality has three characteristics that make it 
highly useful and appealing. First, the equal division rule is easy to implement and requires 
little cognitive effort. Second, the rule is effi cient because it generates clear decisions 
which often lead to successful coordination. And third, decisions that conform to this 
rule can be easily justifi ed to fellow group members because in symmetric resource 
dilemmas such decisions are in accordance with a general norm of fairness. Whereas 
earlier research mainly focused on the fi rst two characteristics of equality, namely 
its simplicity (see e.g., Allison et al., 1992) and effi ciency (see e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 
1995), little research has investigated the third characteristic, specifi cally, its justifying 
potential. This latter characteristic is certainly worth investigating because people are 
often concerned about justifying their decisions to others (e.g., Tenbrunsel, 1995) and 
this concern often has a large impact on their decisions (e.g., De Cremer, Snyder & 
Dewitte, 2001; Tetlock, 1992). In the present research, we extend previous research by 
13  This chapter is based on De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer and De Rooij (in press).
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addressing this largely unexplored characteristic of equality. However, we will not only 
focus on how people justify their decisions using equality, we also investigate how they 
do this when equality cannot be so easily employed.
Thus, the main aim of this paper is to extend previous research by not only 
focusing on social dilemma situations in which people can easily apply the equal 
division rule, but also by focusing on situations in which the application of this rule is 
hampered. More specifi cally, we argue and show that whether or not equality prescribes 
one unequivocal amount to harvest largely depends on uncertainty regarding the 
environmental characteristics of the social dilemma.
Justifying Decisions in Resource Dilemmas: Equality and Self-restraint
 In a typical resource dilemma experiment (see e.g., Budescu, Rapoport & 
Suleiman, 1990; Gustafsson, Biel & Gärling, 1999a; Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman & 
Weg, 1992), participants are collectively endowed with a resource of money or chips 
from which each group member can request an amount. As long as their total group 
request does not exceed the resource size, all individual requests are granted. If the 
collective request exceeds the amount available in the common resource, the resource 
becomes depleted and all group members receive zero outcomes. Now let us assume 
that the resource contains 500 coins and that the group consists of fi ve group members. 
What would be the most justifi able harvest in this situation?
In such a resource dilemma, we can expect that harvesting an equal share of 
the resource can be most easily justifi ed to fellow group members, mainly because this 
decision is in line with a general norm of fairness (Messick, 1993). Thus, in this situation, 
we can expect that group members will be especially inclined to adhere to equality 
when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. Group members 
can do so by simply dividing the size of the resource by the number of group members. 
When fi ve people share a resource of 500 coins, the equal division rule prescribes that 
group members should harvest 100 coins from the resource (500/5 = 100). Harvesting 
100 coins can be most easily justifi ed to fellow group members. After all, when all 
decide to do so, the social dilemma results in a “fair” distribution of coins.
But what happens when equality does not prescribe such a specifi c level of 
harvesting? In social dilemmas, it is not always clear what an equal division would be 
(cf. Allison et al., 1992). To calculate an equal share, people need exact information 
about both the size of the resource and the size of the group sharing that resource. 
In many real-life social dilemmas, people are uncertain about such environmental 
characteristics. In other words, social dilemmas are often characterized by environmental 
uncertainty (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988; for a review, see Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, 
& Budescu, 2004). In resource dilemmas, for instance, there can be uncertainty about 
the total number of resources that can be harvested without jeopardizing the state 
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of the resource (i.e., resource size uncertainty). For example, electricity consumers 
often do not know how large the available supply of electricity is (for more real-world 
examples, see Ostrom, 1990). In this case, it is diffi cult for group members to calculate 
their equal share. What is an equal share of an uncertain common resource? Thus, 
when the size of a common resource is uncertain, the equal division rule does not 
prescribe a specifi c level of harvesting, and therefore it is much more diffi cult to apply 
this rule. How will people justify their decisions to fellow group members under such 
resource size uncertainty?
Our basic premise is that people will then try to justify their harvesting 
decisions differently – by displaying self-restraint in their harvests. In particular, we 
argue that relatively low harvests are easier to justify to fellow group members than 
relatively high harvests because they are in line with a general norm of cooperation 
(see De Cremer & Bakker, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kerr, 1995; Komorita & 
Parks, 1995). Moreover, under resource size uncertainty low harvests decrease the 
chance that the common resource will become depleted, which would be detrimental 
to collective interests. Therefore, whereas we expect that under resource size certainty 
harvesting decisions adhering to equality can be most easily justifi ed to fellow group 
members, under resource size uncertainty we expect that relatively low harvests can 
be most easily justifi ed.
We will investigate this line of reasoning in two experimental studies. As a 
fi rst test of our ideas, in Study 4.1 we will measure the justifi ability of different harvests 
under varying levels of environmental uncertainty. In Study 4.2, we will investigate how 
justifi ability pressures infl uence actual harvesting behavior by manipulating accountability 
under varying levels of environmental uncertainty.
Study 4.1: The Justifi ability of Harvests
 We investigate our line of reasoning in a single-trial resource dilemma. In this 
paradigm, a group of people have access to a resource from which each of them can freely 
harvest. If the total amount harvested by the group exceeds the amount available in the 
resource, the resource becomes depleted and all group members receive zero outcomes 
(cf. Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 1992). It is important 
to note here that under resource size certainty the task environment allows for equality to 
prescribe a specifi c harvest level: in a group of N group members, each member should 
harvest 1/Nth of the resource. With an uncertain resource, equality does not prescribe such 
a specifi c harvest level (cf. De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 2006).
We predict that under resource size certainty participants will fi nd harvests 
adhering to equality most justifi able. More specifi cally, they will fi nd harvests adhering 
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to equality easier to justify than harvests either lower or higher than an equal share 
(Hypothesis 4.1). Under resource size uncertainty participants will fi nd relatively low 
harvests easier to justify than relatively high harvests (Hypothesis 4.2).
To test these hypotheses, we assessed the justifi ability of harvests under 
varying levels of resource size uncertainty (i.e., No vs. Low vs. High Uncertainty). To 
accomplish this, we presented participants with a series of three different harvests. 
Participants were asked to indicate how justifi able these harvests were.
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 39 students at Leiden University 
(9 men, M age = 21.38 years) who participated voluntarily in the present study. A 3 
(Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. Low vs. High) × 3 (Harvest: 50 vs. 100 vs. 150 
coins) factorial design with repeated measures on the latter factor was used.
Procedure. Participants read a written description of a resource dilemma. In 
this dilemma, a group of fi ve people had access to a resource from which each group 
member could freely harvest a number of coins (these coins were each worth € 0.01; 
approximately US $ 0.013). If the collective harvest would be lower than or equal to the 
resource size, the harvests would be granted and each group member would earn the 
amount of money he or she had harvested. If, however, the group’s collective harvest 
would exceed the resource size, all group members would earn zero outcomes.
Resource Size Uncertainty. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three Resource Size Uncertainty conditions. These three conditions differed in the extent 
to which there was uncertainty about the size of the common resource. Resource size 
uncertainty was manipulated by varying the range of the uniform distribution of possible 
resource sizes (cf. Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 
1992). The midpoint of these ranges was constant across the three conditions, i.e., 
500. Under No Uncertainty the resource size was certain, i.e., 500 coins (midpoint = 
500, range = 0). Under Low Uncertainty the resource would contain at least 400 and 
at most 600 coins (midpoint = 500, range = 200). Under High Uncertainty the resource 
would contain at least 100 and at most 900 coins (midpoint = 500, range = 800). Under 
Low and High Uncertainty participants learned that afterwards the exact size of the 
resource would be randomly drawn from the uniform distribution by a computer (i.e., 
each possible resource size had an equal chance of being drawn from the range).
Three Different Harvests. Participants were presented with three different 
harvests (i.e., 50, 100 and 150 coins). For each of these harvests, participants were 
asked to imagine that they would have to justify this harvest to their fellow group 
members.
Justifi ability Measure. To measure the justifi ability of these harvests, participants 
were asked to fi ll in two questions about each harvest (i.e., “To what extent would you 
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be able to justify this harvest to your fellow group members?” and “To what extent 
would you be able to defend this harvest to your fellow group members?”; 1 = not 
at all; 7 = very much so). These two items were aggregated to form one measure of 
justifi ability (Cronbach’s α > .93).
Results
Manipulation Check of Resource Size Uncertainty. Participants indicated how 
uncertain they were about the size of the resource (1 = not uncertain at all; 7 = very 
uncertain). An ANOVA on this measure yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource 
Size Uncertainty, F(2, 36) = 29.59, p < .001, η2 = .62. As expected, uncertainty was 
lowest under No Uncertainty (M = 1.62), higher under Low Uncertainty (M = 4.54) and 
highest under High Uncertainty (M = 6.08), indicating that we successfully manipulated 
resource size uncertainty.
The Justifi ability of Harvests. For each harvest, participants answered two 
justifi ability questions. A 3 (Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. Low vs. High) × 3 
(Harvest: 50 vs. 100 vs. 150 coins) ANOVA on the aggregated justifi ability measure 
yielded a signifi cant main effect of Harvest, F(2, 35) = 35.32, p < .001, η2 = .67, and 
a signifi cant Uncertainty × Harvest interaction effect, F(4, 72) = 4.94, p < .01, η2 = .22 
(see Table 4.1). The main effect of Harvest indicated that, overall, participants thought 
that lower harvests would be easier to justify. In line with our hypotheses, the interaction 
effect between Uncertainty and Harvest indicated that whereas under No Uncertainty 
participants indicated that harvesting an equal share (i.e., 100 coins) would be easier 
to justify than harvesting either less (i.e., 50 coins) or more than an equal share (i.e., 
150 coins; see Hypothesis 4.1), under Uncertainty participants indicated that lower 
harvests would be easier to justify than higher harvests (see Hypothesis 4.2). To test 
these effects more specifi cally, we performed contrast analyses within each level of 
resource size uncertainty (see Table 4.1), which also corroborated our hypotheses.
Table 4.1
Study 4.1: Justifi ability of Three Different Harvests under Three Levels of Resource Size Uncertainty (3 × 3)
Resource Size Uncertainty
Harvest






















Note. Higher scores denote harvests that are easier to justify. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
For each row, means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (contrast analyses, all ps < .05).
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Discussion
 The results of Study 4.1 corroborate our fi rst two hypotheses. Under No 
Uncertainty participants indicated that harvests adhering to equality were easiest to 
justify (Hypothesis 4.1), whereas under Uncertainty they indicated that relatively low 
harvests were easiest to justify (Hypothesis 4.2). More specifi cally, under No Uncertainty 
participants indicated that harvests that adhered to equality were easier to justify than 
harvests either lower or higher than an equal share. Under (Low and High) Uncertainty 
participants indicated that lower harvests were easier to justify than higher harvests. 
But how do these justifi ability judgments translate into actual harvesting decisions?
Accountability and Harvesting Decisions
Whereas Study 4.1 provided fi rst insights into the justifi ability of harvests, 
this study did not assess participants’ actual choice behavior. In the following, we 
will therefore address the following question: How do justifi cation pressures infl uence 
actual harvesting decisions? In Study 4.2, participants will make harvesting decisions 
themselves, and we will manipulate whether they will have to justify these decisions to 
fellow group members or not. We will do so by manipulating accountability.
Accountability can be defi ned as the expectation that one may have to justify 
one’s judgments and decisions to others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In many real-life 
social dilemmas, people are accountable for the judgments and decisions they make. 
For instance, as Ostrom illustrates in her book “Governing the Commons” (1990), 
fi shermen often keep a close eye on each other to make sure that other fi shermen 
are not fi shing more than they should, which would lead to over-fi shing and eventually 
to depletion of the fi sh population. Lerner and Tetlock (1999) distinguish two types 
of accountability: outcome and process accountability. Outcome accountability refers 
to accountability for the decision outcome, and process accountability refers to 
accountability for the process leading to the decision. Furthermore, accountability may 
have different psychological effects on people: Whereas several studies have shown 
that accountability induces systematic processing (e.g., Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, 
1989; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989), other studies have shown that accountability reduces 
egotism (e.g., Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 
2005). These fi ndings show that, depending on the context and the nature of the 
accountability manipulation, accountability may have different psychological effects, 
which in turn may have different effects on people’s decisions. Thus, to predict the effect 
of accountability in a certain context, it is useful to fi rst fi nd out what accountability does 
psychologically. To investigate the psychological effects of accountability in the social 
dilemma context we focus on, we conducted a short pilot study.
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The Psychological Effects of Accountability: A Pilot Study
We presented 48 participants (18 men, M age = 21.88 years) with the same 
resource dilemma as in Study 1, using the same resource size uncertainty manipulation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions of a 2(Accountability: No vs. 
Yes) × 2(Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. High) between-participants design. In the 
Accountability condition, participants were asked to imagine that they would make 
a harvesting decision and that afterwards they would have to justify this decision to 
their fellow group members. In the No Accountability condition, participants were 
only asked to imagine that they would make a harvesting decision. Subsequently, we 
measured outcome accountability using one item and process accountability using two 
items (based on Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad & De Dreu, in press; sample item 
measuring process accountability: “In this situation, I would expect that I would have to 
explain how I came to my decision.”; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so; Cronbach’s α = 
.90), systematic processing using two items (based on De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; 
sample item: “In this situation, I would try to make a thorough decision.”; 1 = not at all, 
7 = very much so; Cronbach’s α = .63), and egotism using four items (sample item: 
“While making my decision, I would be focused on my own outcomes.”; 1 = not at all, 
7 = very much so; Cronbach’s α = .73).
The results of this study showed that the accountability manipulation induced 
both outcome and process accountability (both Fs > 50, both ps < .001). Thus, in the 
Accountability condition participants felt more accountable for the decision outcome 
(M = 5.46, SD = 1.56) as well as for the process that would lead to their decision 
(M = 5.17, SD = 1.65) than in the No Accountability condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.69 
vs. M = 1.73, SD = 1.27, respectively). We did not fi nd an effect of accountability on 
systematic processing, F(1, 47) = .72, p = .40, η2 = .02 (MAccountability = 5.92, SD = 0.72 vs. 
MNo Accountability = 5.73, SD = 0.79). We did fi nd that accountability reduced egotism, 
F(1, 47) = 7.00, p < .05, η2 = .14, indicating that in the Accountability condition 
participants were less focused on their own outcomes (M = 3.74, SD = 1.28) than 
participants in the No Accountability condition (M = 4.57, SD = 0.89).
Study 4.2: Justifying Decisions
So how does accountability infl uence actual choice behavior in resource 
dilemmas with resource size certainty? In Study 4.1, we showed that under resource 
size certainty, harvesting an equal share is easiest to justify to fellow group members. 
Furthermore, the pilot study we conducted showed that accountability reduces egotism, 
which implies that accountability will induce people to adhere more to group norms. 
Based on these fi ndings, we can expect that accountability will induce people’s harvests 
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to converge towards equality, and that under accountability people’s harvests will be 
closer to the level prescribed by equality than under no accountability. Moreover, as we 
expect accountability to induce convergence, we predict that under accountability the 
variance of harvests will be smaller than under no accountability. 
But how does accountability infl uence harvests in resource dilemmas with 
resource size uncertainty? To answer this question, we fi rst have to consider people’s 
harvesting behavior under resource size uncertainty when they are not accountable 
for their harvests. Earlier research on environmental uncertainty (e.g., Budescu et 
al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 1992) – in which participants 
were not accountable for their decisions – has repeatedly shown that environmental 
uncertainty induces people to over-harvest from the common resource. To predict how 
accountability infl uences choice behavior under resource size uncertainty it is useful to 
consider the fi ndings of Study 4.1 and the results of our pilot study. In Study 4.1, we 
showed that under resource size uncertainty relatively low harvests are easier to justify 
than relatively high harvests. Furthermore, our pilot study showed that accountability 
reduces egotism, which implies that under accountability people will be more inclined 
to show self-restraint. Based on these fi ndings, we predict that under uncertainty 
accountability may induce a drive towards harvesting less, and that accountability may 
temper the over-harvesting effect that is usually found under environmental uncertainty. 
Moreover, under resource size uncertainty we expect that accountability will not reduce 
the variance of harvests. After all, under uncertainty equality does not prescribe a 
specifi c amount to harvest, and therefore we expect that accountability will not induce 
convergence towards a specifi c amount.
Based on the above, we expect that under certainty being accountable to fellow 
group members will induce harvests to converge towards equality. More specifi cally, we 
expect that in the accountability condition the mean harvest will be closer to the level 
prescribed by equality than in the no accountability condition (Hypothesis 4.3). Under 
uncertainty, we expect that accountability will induce lower harvests (Hypothesis 4.4). 
Furthermore, we expect that under certainty accountability will reduce the variance in 
harvests, whereas we expect that under uncertainty accountability will not reduce the 
variance (Hypothesis 4.5).
Resource Size Estimates
Hypotheses 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 focus exclusively on how environmental 
uncertainty and accountability affect people’s harvests. However, justifi cation pressures 
may not only affect people’s harvests, but may also infl uence their estimates of the size 
of the common resource. Therefore, besides investigating harvests, we will also study 
how environmental uncertainty and accountability infl uence resource size estimates. 
In earlier studies, environmental uncertainty induced participants to overestimate the 
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size of the resource (Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 
1992). We will test whether this overestimation effect also occurs under accountability. 
Earlier studies have generated fi ndings that suggest that harvests and resource size 
estimates are strongly interrelated (cf. Wit & Wilke, 1998). Based on this, we expect that 
accountability will not only induce lower harvests but also lower resource size estimates 
(Hypothesis 4.6).
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 110 students at Leiden University 
(31 men, M age = 19.83 years) who volunteered for the study. A 2 (Accountability: No 
vs. Yes) × 3 (Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. Low vs. High) factorial design with 
repeated measures on the latter factor was used.
Procedure. Participants were invited to participate in a study on “group 
decision making”. Upon arrival, they were seated in separate cubicles, each containing a 
personal computer, which was used to give instructions and to register the participants’ 
responses.
The Resource Dilemma. The resource dilemma was identical to the one used 
in Study 4.1. Participants were now presented with three of these resource dilemmas 
(referred to as ‘situations’). Afterwards, a computer would randomly select one of these 
three situations. This selected situation would be used to calculate the amount of 
money they would earn. Each of these situations was thus an independent single-trial 
resource dilemma.
Resource Size Uncertainty. Resource Size Uncertainty was manipulated 
within participants (cf. Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et 
al., 1992). The three Uncertainty conditions were identical to the ones used in Study 
4.1. These conditions were counter-balanced to check for order effects. Preliminary 
analyses revealed no signifi cant order effects on any of the dependent variables 
(all Fs < 1).
All characteristics of the three dilemmas were explained before the participants 
were presented with the actual task. After these instructions, fi ve practice questions 
were posed to ensure comprehension of the dilemmas. For example, participants 
were asked how much group members would earn if the total group harvest would 
exceed the size of the resource. Each question was answered correctly by 98% of 
all participants. After each question, the correct answer was disclosed and the most 
important characteristics of the dilemmas were repeated. Subsequently, accountability 
was manipulated.
Accountability. In the Accountability condition, before being presented with 
the dilemmas, participants were instructed that afterwards their fellow group members 
would learn of their decisions (i.e., their individual harvests and their resource size 
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estimates) and that they would have to justify these decisions to their fellow group 
members (for a similar accountability manipulation, see Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 
1989). Immediately after this accountability manipulation, the three dilemmas were 
presented to the participants. Participants in the No Accountability condition did not 
receive this accountability manipulation, but were presented with the three dilemmas 
immediately after the practice questions.
Dependent Measures. In all three Uncertainty conditions, participants were 
asked to harvest a number of coins from the resource and to estimate the size of the 
resource.
After the experimental session, which lasted about 45 minutes, all participants 
learned that they did not have to justify their decisions to their fellow group members. 
We paid all participants € 8 (i.e., approximately US $ 11.00) for their participation. All 
participants agreed to this payment procedure.
Results
Unless stated otherwise, all analyses were performed with 2 (Accountability) × 
3 (Resource Size Uncertainty) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the latter factor.
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation of resource size uncertainty was 
checked by asking the participants to indicate how uncertain they were about the 
size of the resource in each of the three situations (1 = not uncertain at all; 7 = very 
uncertain). A 2 × 3 ANOVA on this measure only yielded a main effect of Resource 
Size Uncertainty, F(2, 107) = 705.95, p < .001, η2 = .93. Participants indicated that 
their uncertainty about the size of the resource was lowest under No Uncertainty 
(M = 1.16), higher under Low Uncertainty (M = 4.85) and highest under High Uncertainty 
(M = 6.59), indicating that we successfully manipulated Resource Size Uncertainty.
The manipulation of accountability was checked by asking participants 
afterwards to what extent they had felt accountable for the decisions they had made 
in the resource dilemmas (1 = to a small extent; 7 = to a large extent). An ANOVA on 
this measure only yielded a main effect of Accountability, F(1, 108) = 168.09, p < .001, 
η2 = .61. As expected, compared to the No Accountability condition (M = 1.73), 
participants felt more accountable for their decisions in the Accountability condition 
(M = 5.36), indicating that we successfully manipulated accountability.
Individual Harvests. A 2 × 3 ANOVA on participants’ harvests yielded a 
signifi cant main effect of Accountability, F(1, 108) = 4.18, p < .05, η2 = .04 (See Table 
4.2). In the No Accountability condition (M = 138.70), participants harvested more coins 
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from the resource than in the Accountability condition (M = 106.79).14 These results 
suggest that accountability induces cooperation, which is in line with fi ndings from 
earlier studies on accountability in social dilemmas (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2001; Jerdee 
& Rosen, 1974). In the No Accountability condition, we replicated the over-harvesting 
effect that was found in earlier research (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et 
al., 1999a; Rapoport et al., 1992), i.e., harvests increased with Uncertainty, F(2, 53) = 
3.00, p < .05, η2 = .10. This over-harvesting effect was not found in the Accountability 
condition, F(2, 53) = .46, p = .64, η2 = .02.
Table 4.2



















Note. Higher scores denote higher harvests. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. For each row, 
standard deviations with different superscripts indicate that the variances in these cells differ signifi cantly 
(Levene’s tests).
Individual Harvests under Resource Size Certainty. To test whether under 
resource size certainty accountability induced participants to adhere more strongly 
to equality, we took a closer look at their harvests in the No Uncertainty condition. 
In line with our predictions, t-tests showed that whereas participants’ harvests were 
signifi cantly higher than an equal share (i.e., 100 coins) in the No Accountability 
condition (M = 120.98; t(54) = 1.97, p < .05, one-sided), in the Accountability condition 
their harvests did not deviate signifi cantly from equality (M = 101.82; t(54) = .46, 
p = .65). These results corroborate Hypothesis 4.3 that under certainty accountability 
would induce harvests to converge towards equality.
Individual Harvests under Resource Size Uncertainty. To test whether under 
uncertainty accountability induced participants to restrict their harvests, we took a 
14  In accordance with fi ndings from earlier studies on environmental uncertainty (Budescu et al., 1990; 
Gustafsson et al., 1999; Rapoport et al., 1992) and in agreement with our line of reasoning (cf. De Kwaadsteniet 
et al., 2006), the variances under High Uncertainty were much larger than the variances under No and Low 
Uncertainty. To meet the requirements of the ANOVA, we applied a square root transformation on participants’ 
harvests (cf. Rapoport et al., 1992). After applying this transformation, which successfully reduced the 
heterogeneity of variances, a 2 × 3 ANOVA still yielded the same signifi cant main effect of Accountability, 
F(1, 108) = 7.39, p < .01, η2 = .06.
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closer look at their harvests under Low and High Uncertainty. Accountability induced 
participants to harvest smaller amounts under Low Uncertainty (MAccountability = 112.91 
vs. MNo Accountability = 137.89) and under High Uncertainty (MAccountability = 105.64 vs. 
MNo Accountability = 157.24). However, it should be noted that this difference was only 
signifi cant under High Uncertainty (t(108) = 2.10, p < .05), but not under Low Uncertainty 
(t(108) = 1.33, p < .20). In line with Hypothesis 4.4, these results indicate that under 
(high) uncertainty accountability induces people to show self-restraint in their harvests.
Variance in Harvests. There is no standard way to test the predicted interaction 
of Accountability and Resource Size Uncertainty on variance in harvesting decisions 
(Hypothesis 4.5). Testing homogeneity of variances is usually done using a Levene’s 
test. However, standard software (e.g., SPSS) does not provide the option of a factorial 
Levene’s test – not for between nor for (between-)within designs. Basically, a Levene’s 
test is a one-way ANOVA on a calculated absolute difference score (see Levene, 1960): 
First, one should compute a new variable which indicates how much each participant’s 
score deviates from the mean in his/her cell; Second, one should do an ANOVA on this 
calculated variable. We followed this procedure, but instead of the one-way ANOVA we 
performed a 2 (between) × 3 (within) factorial ANOVA. 
Thus, we fi rst calculated the absolute difference between each participant’s 
individual harvest and the mean of the cell the participant was in. A preliminary inspection 
of these calculated difference scores indicated that the standard deviations of these scores 
were highly unequal (i.e., the largest SD was more than four times as large as the smallest 
one), thereby violating the homogeneity of variances assumption of ANOVA. To meet the 
requirements of the ANOVA, we applied a square root transformation on these difference 
scores. After applying this transformation, which successfully reduced the heterogeneity of 
variances, we conducted a 2 × 3 ANOVA. This ANOVA yielded a signifi cant main effect of 
Accountability, F(1, 108) = 9.39, p < .001, η2 = .08, a signifi cant main effect of Uncertainty, F(2, 
107) = 63.68, p < .001, η2 = .54, and a signifi cant interaction effect between Accountability and 
Uncertainty, F(2, 107) = 63.68, p < .001, η2 = .54. In line with Hypothesis 4.5, this interaction 
effect indicated that whereas accountability signifi cantly reduced the variance under No 
Uncertainty, it did not reduce the variance under Low and High Uncertainty (see Table 4.2).
Resource Size Estimates. In each of the three situations, participants estimated 
the resource size (see Table 4.3). The No Uncertainty condition was excluded from the 
analysis of these estimates because in this condition participants knew the exact size 
of the resource. A 2 (Accountability) × 2 (Resource Size Uncertainty: Low vs. High) 
ANOVA on participants’ resource size estimates yielded a signifi cant main effect of 
Accountability, F(1, 108) = 13.17, p < .001, η2 = .11, and a signifi cant interaction effect 
of Accountability and Uncertainty, F(1, 108) = 8.38, p < .01, η2 = .07.
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Table 4.3














Note. Higher scores denote higher resource size estimates. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
These analyses showed that in the Accountability condition (M = 429.55), 
participants gave lower resource size estimates than in the No Accountability condition 
(M = 527.96), especially under High Uncertainty (M = 404.09 vs. 564.18, respectively). 
The data also showed that participants’ resource size estimates increased with 
resource size uncertainty in the No Accountability condition, F(1, 54) = 6.94, p < .05, 
η2 = .11, whereas this effect was not found in the Accountability condition, F(1, 54) = 
2.45, p = .12, η2 = .04. In the Accountability condition, the resource size estimates 
even decreased slightly with increasing uncertainty. In accordance with Hypothesis 4.6, 
these results suggest that accountability induces people to give lower resource size 
estimates.
Application of the Equal Division Rule under Resource Size Uncertainty. As 
an additional analysis under Uncertainty, we also looked at the relationship between 
participants’ harvests and their own resource size estimates.15 Specifi cally, we calculated 
the percentage of participants who harvested an equal share of their own resource size 
estimates. This analysis showed that the percentage of participants who harvested 
an equal share of their own resource size estimates was signifi cantly higher in the 
Accountability condition (66%) than in the No Accountability condition (46%), χ2(1, N = 
110) = 4.45, p < .05. These fi ndings show that even under uncertainty, accountability 
induced participants to harvest one-fi fth of their own resource size estimates. We 
elaborate on these fi ndings in the General Discussion.
Discussion
 The results of Study 4.2 corroborate our second set of hypotheses (i.e., 
Hypotheses 4.3 to 4.6). Under No Uncertainty, we found that in the Accountability 
condition the mean harvest was closer to the level prescribed by equality than in 
the No Accountability condition (Hypothesis 4.3). Under Uncertainty, we found 
15  We also tested whether the effect of accountability on harvests was mediated by resource size estimates 
and/or whether the effect of accountability on resource size estimates was mediated by harvests. These 
mediation analyses (partially) corroborated both mediation models, suggesting that harvests and resource size 
estimates are strongly interrelated (cf. Wit & Wilke, 1998).
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that accountability induced lower harvests (Hypothesis 4.4). Moreover, under No 
Uncertainty we found that accountability induced these harvests to converge towards 
a specifi c harvest level, whereas this as not the case under Uncertainty. In other words, 
under No Uncertainty we found that accountability reduced the variance in harvests, 
whereas under Uncertainty accountability did not reduce the variance (Hypothesis 4.5). 
Additionally, we found that in the Accountability condition participants’ resource size 
estimates were smaller than in the No Accountability condition (Hypothesis 4.6).
 We would like to point out that to draw the above-mentioned conclusions it 
was essential to not only look at the means, but also at the variance of participants’ 
harvests. For instance, had we only looked at participants’ mean harvests we would 
not have been able to distinguish the Accountability-No Uncertainty condition from the 
Accountability-Uncertainty conditions. After all, in both of these accountability conditions 
the mean harvest was close to an equal share of the expected value of the pool-size 
(i.e., 100 coins). Solely on the basis of these means one might thus conclude that 
accountability always (i.e., under certainty and under uncertainty) induces adherence 
to the amount prescribed by equality. However, when the variance of people’s harvests 
is taken into account, our data provide a whole different picture. Whereas under No 
Uncertainty accountability signifi cantly reduced the variance of people’s harvests, under 
Uncertainty accountability did not reduce the variance. In line with our ideas, these 
fi ndings imply that whereas under certainty accountability indeed induces convergence 
to a specifi c harvest level (i.e., an equal share), under uncertainty it does not lead to 
such convergence.
Another point worth making is that at fi rst glance there seems to be a 
discrepancy between the results of Study 4.1 and the results of Study 4.2. In Study 
4.1, a harvest of 50 was found most justifi able under uncertainty, whereas in Study 
4.2 participants harvested more than 50 in the uncertainty-accountability condition. 
We attribute this discrepancy to the fact that whereas in Study 4.1 we asked people 
how justifi able three hypothetical harvesting decisions were, in Study 4.2 we asked 
people to make real harvesting decisions themselves. Even under accountability 
real harvesting decisions are driven by more than just justifi ability judgments. After 
all, whereas accountability may motivate people to make justifi able decisions (i.e., a 
drive towards harvesting less), they may at the same time still be motivated to further 
their self-interest (i.e., a drive towards harvesting more). The results of study 4.1 only 
demonstrate the drive towards cooperation that is induced by accountability, which is 
not the only factor that infl uences real harvesting behavior. This reasoning explains why 
the participants in Study 4.2 harvested more than 50 coins.
 To conclude, the fi ndings of Study 4.2 may be explained by the fi nding of 
our pilot study that accountability reduces egotism. Whereas under certainty such 
reduced egotism may have induced adherence to equality, under uncertainty it may 
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have induced self-restraint. Further, since harvests and resource size estimates are 
strongly interrelated (Wit & Wilke, 1998), this reduced egotism may also explain why 
participants gave lower estimates of an uncertain resource under accountability.
Group Effi ciency: A Monte Carlo Study
The primary focus of this paper is on how people justify their individual 
harvests. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to explore whether there is a relation 
between accountability and group effi ciency. After all, effi ciency is one of the three 
characteristics of equality (Messick, 1993). To investigate such group effi ciency, 
we decided to do an extra analysis on the data of Study 4.2. We focused on two 
aspects as indications of effi ciency: (a) overuse of the common resource and (b) group 
earnings. To investigate these two aspects, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation in which 
we randomly drew 2 × 100,000 post-hoc fi ve-person groups from the sample of Study 
4.2 (100,000 groups for each Accountability condition). Under No Uncertainty, the size 
of the resource was always 500 coins. Under Uncertainty, the size of the resource 
was determined by randomly drawing a number from the uniform distribution of the 
resource size (which was done separately for each of the 200,000 fi ve-person groups). 
For each post-hoc group, we checked whether the group harvest had exceeded the 
size of the common resource and we calculated the total group earnings. If the total 
group harvest exceeded the size of the resource, the resource was overused and the 
group earned zero coins. If the total group harvest did not exceed the resource size, 
the group earned the amount they had harvested.
Results
Overuse. As a fi rst step, we analyzed how often these post-hoc groups 
overused the common resource (i.e., as a dichotomous variable: overuse vs. no 
overuse). To statistically qualify the differences between the percentages “overuse” in the 
six conditions (see Table 4.4) we calculated the Odds ratios per condition. For example, 
the Odds of overuse in the No Uncertainty / No Accountability condition (59.64%) were 
calculated as [P (overuse)] / [1 - P (overuse)] = [.5964] / [1 - .5964] = 1.48. Thereafter, the 
effect size of the contrast between Accountability and No Accountability was calculated 
as the ratio of the two Odds in these conditions (e.g., 1.48 / 0.41 = 3.56; see Table 
4.4). Based on Rosenthal (1996), the effect size of accountability under No Uncertainty 
(3.56) can be considered ‘medium to large’, the effect size of accountability under 
Low Uncertainty (4.87) can be considered large, and the effect size of accountability 
under High Uncertainty (2.83) can be considered medium. In sum, accountability to a 
‘medium to large’ extent reduces the chance of overuse across all three uncertainty 
conditions. Looking at the overall pattern of the effect sizes in Table 4.4, we conclude 
that the chances of overuse in the 2 × 3 design are a function of accountability (less 
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frequent overuse in the Accountability condition than in the No Accountability condition) 
and a function of uncertainty (less frequent overuse under No Uncertainty than under 
Low and High Uncertainty).
Table 4.4




No 59.64% 3.56 29.31%
2.86 2.09
Low 80.87% 4.87 46.44%
1.41 1.22




Note. Effect sizes of orthogonal contrasts are displayed in italics. The lower part of this table displays the effect 
sizes of the contrasts between No and High Uncertainty.
Group Earnings. Additionally, we calculated the mean group earnings in the 
various conditions. An ANOVA on these group earnings yielded the following results. 
First, mean group earnings were higher in the Accountability condition (M = 252.40) 
than in the No Accountability condition (M = 142.69), F(1, 199998) = 345732.45, 
p < .0001, η2 = .63. Second, mean group earnings were higher under No Uncertainty 
(M = 266.15) than under Low Uncertainty (M = 159.40) and High Uncertainty (M = 
167.08), F(2, 199997) = 19220.28, p < .0001, η2 = .16 (see Table 4.5). In accordance 
with our overuse data, these analyses showed that there is a main effect of accountability 
and a main effect of uncertainty on group effi ciency.
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Table 4.5



















Note. Higher scores denote higher group earnings. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Discussion
The results of this additional Monte Carlo study clearly show that groups 
are more effi cient under accountability. Furthermore, the fi ndings demonstrated that 
groups are more effi cient under certainty than under uncertainty. We will elaborate on 
these fi ndings in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
 In the present paper, we investigated how justifi cation pressures infl uence 
harvesting decisions in social dilemmas. As expected, under resource size certainty 
we found that people consider harvests adhering to equality as most justifi able (Study 
4.1) and that people adhere more strongly to equality when they have to justify their 
decisions to fellow group members (Study 4.2). Under resource size uncertainty we 
found that people consider relatively low harvests as most justifi able (Study 4.1) and 
that people restrict their harvests when they have to justify their decisions to fellow 
group members (Study 4.2).16 Additionally we found that accountability induces 
16  The data of Study 2 can also be interpreted as indicating that accountability always induces adherence to 
the most justifi able division rule (which may explain why the mean harvest is so close to an equal share of the 
expected pool-size [i.e., 100 coins] in all uncertainty conditions), but that with greater uncertainty one may feel 
freer to depart from it (which may explain the larger variance under uncertainty). However, we would like to point 
out that in the light of the results of Study 1 this interpretation seems unlikely. After all, the data of this study 
show that under uncertainty people do not think that harvesting 100 coins is the most justifi able decision. More 
specifi cally, the participants indicated that under uncertainty a harvest of 50 coins was easier to justify than a 
harvest of 100 coins. This fi nding illustrates our point that under environmental uncertainty equality does not 
prescribe one specifi c and justifi able amount to harvest, but that under such uncertainty self-restraint yields 
the most justifi able decision. Altogether, the fi ndings of these two studies corroborate our idea that under 
uncertainty accountability induces a drive towards self-restraint.
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people to give lower estimates of the size of the resource (Study 4.2). In the following, 
we will address the general implications of these fi ndings.
Accountability and Environmental Uncertainty
 With the current research we obtained new insights into the effects of 
environmental uncertainty and accountability in social dilemmas. Earlier studies 
on environmental uncertainty (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; 
Rapoport et al., 1992) have repeatedly shown that such uncertainty leads to over-
harvesting. When environmental uncertainty increased, people increased their 
harvests. Based on these fi ndings, it was concluded that environmental uncertainty is 
detrimental to collective outcomes because it increases the chance that the resource 
becomes depleted. As expected, we replicated the above-mentioned over-harvesting 
effect in the no accountability condition, and we did not fi nd an over-harvesting effect 
under accountability. These fi ndings imply that the detrimental effects of environmental 
uncertainty may disappear when group members have to justify their choice behavior to 
fellow group members. Thus, accountability may provide a solution for the detrimental 
effects of environmental uncertainty.
Accountability and Effi cient Coordination
 Our fi ndings imply that under environmental uncertainty accountability to 
fellow group members is benefi cial to collective interests because it induces self-
restraint. This does not mean, however, that people who are held accountable for their 
decisions will effi ciently deal with the social dilemma at hand, even if they are highly 
motivated to do so. To investigate how accountability infl uences effi cient coordination, 
it is necessary to analyze harvesting decisions and their outcomes at the group level 
(which is hardly ever done in experimental social dilemma research). Our additional 
Monte Carlo study showed that in all three uncertainty conditions accountability made 
groups more effi cient. More specifi cally, in all three conditions, accountability increased 
group effi ciency by increasing the mean group earnings and decreasing the percentage 
of groups overusing the common resource.
Another issue worth noting is that groups seemed to be much more 
effi cient under certainty than under uncertainty, even when the group members were 
accountable for their decisions. At fi rst glance, this fi nding might seem surprising given 
that in the accountability condition the mean harvest under certainty was quite similar 
to the mean harvest under uncertainty (i.e., all means were close to 100 coins). As we 
stressed earlier, however, these fi ndings can be understood by taking the variance of 
people’s harvests into account, which is especially relevant when it comes to effi cient 
coordination.
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Our variance data show that whereas accountability induced convergence 
to an equal share under certainty, it did not decrease the variance of participants’ 
harvests under uncertainty. This observation is important because variability constitutes 
a potential threat to the collective interest, especially in small group settings. In small 
groups, the presence of only a few over-harvesters may be enough to jeopardize the 
collective interest by increasing the chance that the resource becomes depleted, 
whereas small harvests may jeopardize the collective interest by increasing the chance 
that the resource is underused. As a consequence, high variability in harvests hardly ever 
leads to effi cient use of the resource. In this respect, it is relevant to relate the current 
fi ndings to what Schelling (1960) wrote on the prerequisites of effi cient coordination. As 
he put it, a common understanding is crucial for the tacit coordination of decisions. In 
“The Strategy of Confl ict”, Schelling argues that to tacitly coordinate decisions people 
need to “read the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course 
of action” (Schelling, 1960, p. 54). Under environmental uncertainty such a common 
understanding is clearly missing, leading to a high variance in people’s harvests. This 
high variance can (partially) explain why groups were less effi cient under uncertainty 
than under certainty, even though in the accountability condition the mean harvests in 
all three conditions were almost identical.
A related issue worth noting is that whereas accountability did not reduce the 
variability of harvests under uncertainty, accountability did strengthen the relationship 
between people’s harvests and their own estimates of the size of the resource. Simply 
put, under accountability people differed in their harvests but predominantly indicated 
that they harvested an equal share of the uncertain resource. This fi nding is interesting 
because it shows the strength of equality as a means to justify decisions, even in a 
situation in which the application of this rule is severely hampered. Moreover, what 
these fi ndings also imply is that one should not misinterpret the application of equality 
as an indication of successful coordination. Application of the equal division rule may 
help group members to effi ciently coordinate their harvests only if the rule prescribes 
an unequivocal level of harvesting. To illustrate this, consider a simplifi ed example of 
fi shermen returning from a lake. Fisherman A caught 1,000 fi sh, whereas fi sherman 
B caught 2,000 fi sh. When asked to justify their harvests, fi sherman A answers that 
his catch constitutes an equal share of the total number of fi sh that can be harvested 
without jeopardizing the state of the fi sh population. Fisherman B gives the same 
answer and thereby indicates that he thinks that the total number of fi sh is larger than 
Fisherman A thinks. What should we conclude from this example? Did the fi shermen 
effi ciently coordinate their decisions? Our answer would be that they did not. Although 
the two fi shermen both applied the equal division rule, this did not induce convergence 
to a specifi c level of harvesting because they gave different estimates of the size of the 
fi sh population.
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Explaining Findings from Earlier Research
Our research shows that accountability can yield two different behavioral 
effects: convergence to equality and self-restraint. In Study 4.2, we showed that the task 
environment of a social dilemma plays an important role in how accountability infl uences 
choice behavior, something that has been largely overlooked in earlier accountability 
research. When we take a closer look at the fi ndings of earlier accountability studies, 
we can conclude that these studies have generated mixed results that are in line with 
our reasoning. Whereas some studies showed that accountability induced people’s 
decisions to converge to equality (Croson & Marks, 1998; De Cremer, 2003; Diekmann, 
1997; Reis & Gruzen, 1976), other studies showed that accountability induced a general 
increase in cooperation (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2001; Fox & Guyer, 1978; Jerdee & 
Rosen, 1974; Kerr, 1999). By focusing on the task environment of social dilemmas, the 
current paper now provides an explanation for these different fi ndings. 
Taking a closer look at the experimental procedures of these earlier 
accountability studies, we suggest that the accountability effects observed in these 
studies were contingent upon the environmental characteristics of the social dilemma 
paradigms that were applied. When the task environment allowed for equality to 
prescribe a specifi c level of cooperation (e.g., in a step-level public good dilemma; 
Croson & Marks, 1998; De Cremer, 2003), accountability induced convergence 
towards that level. However, when the task environment did not allow for a division rule 
to prescribe a specifi c level of cooperation (e.g., in a continuous public good dilemma; 
De Cremer et al., 2001), accountability induced relatively high levels of cooperation (but 
no convergence towards a specifi c level). Our procedure of manipulating accountability 
under varying levels of environmental uncertainty, allowed us to investigate this line of 
reasoning in one single experimental design. By doing so, we obtained more insight 
into the fi ndings of accountability studies conducted earlier. Thus, past and present 
research corroborates our idea that the task environment of a social dilemma plays an 
important role in how accountability infl uences choice behavior.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
In this paper, we focused on how people justify their harvesting decisions 
to fellow group members. Of course, one could also imagine situations in which 
people have to justify their decisions to people outside their own group, for instance, 
by introducing other members whose outcomes would be dependent on one of the 
individual group members (i.e., introducing a subgroup). Reis and Gruzen (1976) 
argued and showed that it indeed matters to whom one is accountable (cf. Tetlock, 
1992), and that equality becomes a less salient means for justifi cation when people are 
accountable to someone outside their own group. Although we would be the fi rst to 
acknowledge that our fi ndings do not automatically generalize to justifi cations to such 
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outsiders, we decided to follow earlier accountability research (e.g., De Cremer et al., 
2001; Jerdee & Rosen, 1974; Kerr, 1999) by focusing primarily on how people justify 
their decisions to fellow group members. However, investigating whether the current 
fi ndings generalize to accountability to outsiders may be an interesting suggestion for 
future research.
Another point worth noting is that we used an accountability manipulation that 
was quite strong. We not only told people that their decision would be identifi able, but 
also that they had to justify this decision to their fellow group members. We think that 
other accountability manipulations, such as identifi ability, might yield weaker effects 
than the manipulation we used. After all, only learning that your fellow group members 
will know your decision is less strong than learning that you will also have to justify this 
decision to them. Nevertheless, we think that such a manipulation would yield a similar 
pattern of results. After all, earlier research has shown that identifi ability manipulations 
also reduce egotism (see e.g., De Cremer, Snyder & Dewitte, 2001), which is the 
process that seems to drive our effects. However, to investigate whether our fi ndings 
really generalize to other accountability manipulations, future research should address 
this issue.
It may also be interesting to note that the distribution of participants’ harvests 
was slightly bimodal under high uncertainty (with a peak at 20 coins and another one at 
100 coins). Such bimodality may be indicative of the infl uence of a personality difference, 
suggesting that part of the variance may be explained by a dispositional factor. A 
personality difference that may be relevant in this context is people’s risk preference 
(see e.g., Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002); Perhaps low risk-seekers were more inclined to 
harvest 20 coins, whereas high risk-seekers were more inclined to harvest 100 coins. 
After all, harvesting relatively high amounts is risky, for it increases the chance of the 
resource becoming depleted. Moreover, earlier research has shown that accountability 
often induces a cautious response set (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989), making people extra 
risk-avoidant when they are accountable for their decisions (Tetlock & Boettger, 1994). 
Therefore, investigating whether the present fi ndings are moderated by risk preferences 
may be another interesting suggestion for future research.
Conclusions
To summarize, by investigating how justifi cation pressures infl uence people’s 
harvests under varying levels of environmental uncertainty, the present research has 
generated the following conclusions. First, by investigating the justifying potential of 
equality, we found empirical support for the suggestion that people apply equality 
when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members (cf. Messick, 1993). 
Second, we showed that when equality does not prescribe a specifi c amount to 
harvest, such as under environmental uncertainty, people display self-restraint when 
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they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. Third, by not only focusing 
on the means but also on the variance of harvests, we were able to demonstrate that 
accountability only induces convergence of harvests under environmental certainty. 
And fourth, our Monte Carlo study showed that, although accountability made groups 
more effi cient in all uncertainty conditions, groups were more effi cient under certainty 
than under uncertainty. Altogether, these fi ndings yield new insights into the interplay 
between cooperation, justifi ability and tacit coordination.
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Chapter 5
Emotional Reactions after Overuse17
Almost forty years ago, Garrett Hardin (1968) wrote a famous and infl uential 
article named “The Tragedy of the Commons”. In this article, Hardin addressed the issue 
of how people deal with scarce common resources. As an example, he described how 
a group of herdsmen have access to a common pasture. Each herdsman can decide 
how many animals he keeps on this pasture. It is in each herdsman’s personal interest 
to add more and more animals to his herd. However, if all herdsmen decide to do so, 
the pasture becomes overgrazed, which is detrimental to all herdsmen. According to 
Hardin (p. 1244), since every herdsman pursues his own best interest, freedom in a 
commons inevitably “brings ruin to all”.
A situation such as the one described by Hardin is generally referred to as 
a common resource dilemma, which is a specifi c type of social dilemma. A real-life 
example of a common resource dilemma is the problem of electricity blackouts. Such 
blackouts occur when the electricity grid breaks down because the collective use of 
electricity is higher than the available supply (see e.g., Ostrom, 1990, for other real-
life examples). Since Hardin’s theoretical analysis, numerous empirical studies have 
been conducted to study when overuse occurs and how overuse can be prevented 
(see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; Weber, Kopelman, 
& Messick, 2004, for reviews). However, very little research has been conducted to 
investigate how people respond to their fellow group members when such overuse 
occurs. How do people react to one another when ruin becomes reality? In the present 
chapter, we investigate this largely unexplored question.
In this chapter, we focus on affective and retributive reactions after overuse. 
We will argue and show that group members’ reactions after overuse are largely 
determined by uncertainty regarding the environmental characteristics of a social 
dilemma. We demonstrate that the same negative outcome (i.e., overuse) can lead to 
different affective and retributive reactions, contingent upon group members’ causal 
attributions of such an outcome, and that these attributions are largely determined by 
environmental uncertainty.
Affective Reactions after Overuse
How do people respond when a social dilemma results in overuse? Of 
course, it can be expected that such a negative outcome will elicit negative emotions 
(cf. Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005, 2006). 
17  This chapter is based on De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit and De Cremer (in preparation).
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However, earlier research has shown that affective reactions to negative outcomes 
are not only infl uenced by the value of the outcomes, in the sense that a negative 
outcome would simply induce a negative emotion, but are also determined by the way 
in which such outcomes are attributed (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979; McFarland & 
Ross, 1982; Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
Thus, in order to predict the emotional reactions after overuse, we focus on the causal 
attributions of such an outcome.
When a social dilemma results in overuse, group members will try to make 
sense of this situation by trying to fi nd out who is responsible for the negative outcome 
(cf. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; McFarland, & Ross, 1982; Weiner, 1985). But how 
do people respond affectively when they do fi nd out who is responsible? Specifi cally, 
how do they respond to their fellow group members when they fi nd out that these 
group members can be blamed for the occurring overuse? Earlier research (e.g., Tavris, 
1982) has shown that blaming another person for a negative outcome is associated 
with outward-focused negative emotions – such as anger and hostility. Consequently, 
people will show anger towards their fellow group members when they think that these 
fellow group members have caused the common resource to become depleted. But 
under which circumstances will people attribute overuse to their fellow group members? 
In the following, we argue that this depends on the environmental characteristics of the 
social dilemma.
Environmental Uncertainty and Causal Attributions of Overuse
 How overuse is attributed largely depends on the environmental characteristics 
of the social dilemma. In real life, these environmental characteristics (e.g., the size 
of the common resource) are often uncertain. For instance, in the blackout example 
described earlier, most electricity consumers do not know how large the capacity of the 
electricity grid is. Such environmental uncertainty (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988) 
plays a crucial role in how people attribute overuse in social dilemmas (cf. Rutte, Wilke 
& Messick, 1987), and consequently, how they respond affectively after overuse.
In many experimental studies on common resource dilemmas, participants 
know with certainty how large the common resource is. For instance, participants may 
be told that as a group of fi ve people they share a resource of 500 coins. In that case, all 
group members know with certainty that the social dilemma will result in overuse if the 
collective harvest exceeds 500 coins. After all, when the group members collectively 
harvest more coins than available in the common resource, the resource becomes 
depleted and no-one receives any money. Often, in symmetric common resource 
dilemmas (i.e., all people have equal access to the resource) group members decide to 
harvest an equal share from the common resource (e.g., Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl , 
1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; De Cremer, 2003; Rutte et al., 1987; De Kwaadsteniet et 
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al., 2006; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993, 1995; Van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999). When 
all group members do so, the resource is optimally used and the common resource 
dilemma does not result in overuse. However, when group members violate this rule by 
harvesting more than their equal share, the common resource is over-harvested. Thus, 
when the size of the common resource is known and the dilemma results in overuse, it 
is clear that this failure was caused by the harvesting decisions of the group members. 
Therefore, under resource size certainty people will attribute overuse to their fellow 
group members.
However, in order to know how much the group can harvest without 
jeopardizing the collective interest, group members need specifi c and exact information 
about the task environment of the social dilemma (cf. De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; 
Van Dijk et al., 1999). More specifi cally, to determine how much each group member 
should harvest according to the equal division rule, group members need to know 
exactly how large the common resource is. After all, to calculate an equal share, group 
members need to divide the size of the common resource by the number of group 
members. Consequently, in contrast to resource size certainty, under resource size 
uncertainty it is unclear how much the group members can harvest without jeopardizing 
the common resource. Thus, under resource size uncertainty group members cannot 
simply conclude that overuse was caused by their fellow group members.
Based on the above, we expect that people will attribute overuse more to 
their fellow group members under resource size certainty than under resource size 
uncertainty. In accordance with this expectation – and based on the attribution-emotion 
link described earlier – we predict that people will show stronger negative affective 
reactions towards their fellow group members under resource size certainty than under 
resource size uncertainty.
Outline of the Present Research
 We investigate our line of reasoning in a series of three experimental studies. 
In Study 5.1, we provide a fi rst test of our ideas by investigating how people respond 
affectively after overuse under resource size (un)certainty. In Study 5.2, we extend 
the fi ndings of Study 1 by not only giving people feedback about the outcome of the 
social dilemma (i.e., overuse), but by also investigating their affective responses to 
the harvesting decisions of individual group members. Furthermore, in this study we 
also investigate people’s behavioral responses after overuse, namely, their retributive 
reactions towards fellow group members. Finally, Study 5.3 focuses on the affective and 
retributive responses to group members by outside observers, who are not members 
of the (overusing) group since they do not make any harvesting decisions themselves.
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Study 5.1: Affective Reactions after Overuse
As a fi rst test of our ideas, in Study 5.1 we investigated how people respond 
affectively after overuse. We investigated our line of reasoning in a single-trial common 
resource dilemma paradigm. In this paradigm, a group of people had access to a 
common resource from which each of them could freely harvest. However, if the total 
amount harvested by the group would exceed the amount available in the resource, the 
common resource would become depleted and all group members would receive zero 
outcomes (cf. Budescu et al., 1990; De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; Gustafsson et al., 
1999a, 1999b; Rapoport et al., 1992). We presented participants with either a certain 
or an uncertain common resource from which they could harvest an amount. After the 
group members had made their harvesting decisions, we presented them with bogus 
feedback about the outcome of the dilemma, namely, that the common resource had 
become depleted (i.e., overuse). After that, the negative affect and attribution questions 
were posed.
Hypotheses
We formulated the following hypotheses. First, under resource size certainty 
we expected stronger negative affective reactions than under uncertainty (Hypothesis 
5.1). Second, under resource size certainty we expected group members to attribute 
overuse more to group members’ harvesting behavior than under resource size 
uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.2). Third, we expected the effect of resource size uncertainty 
on negative affective reactions to be mediated by causal attributions of overuse to their 
fellow group members (Hypothesis 5.3).
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 122 students at Leiden University 
(35 men and 87 women, M age = 21.13 years) who were randomly assigned to either 
a resource size certainty or a resource size uncertainty condition. The participants 
received  4 for their participation.
Procedure. The participants were invited to the social-psychological laboratory 
to participate in a study on “group decision making”. Upon arrival they were seated 
in separate cubicles, each containing a personal computer that was used to give 
instructions and to register the participants’ responses.
The Common Resource Dilemma. Participants read a written description of 
a common resource dilemma. In this dilemma, a group of fi ve people had access to a 
common resource from which each group member could freely harvest any number 
of coins (i.e., their individual harvests). The participants were informed that these coins 
were each worth € 0.03 (€ 1 is approximately US $ 1.65). If the collective harvest 
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would be smaller than or equal to the resource size, the harvests would be granted 
and each group member would earn the amount of money he or she had harvested. 
If, however, the group’s collective harvest would exceed the resource size, all group 
members would earn zero outcomes (cf. Budescu et al., 1990; De Kwaadsteniet et al., 
2006; Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 1999b; Rapoport et al., 1992).
Resource Size Uncertainty. Resource size uncertainty was manipulated by 
varying the range of the uniform distribution of possible resource sizes (cf. Budescu et 
al., 1990; Budescu, Suleiman & Rapoport, 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1999a; Rapoport et 
al., 1992). The midpoint of these ranges was kept constant across the two conditions, 
i.e., 500. In the Certainty condition, the size of the resource was certain, i.e., 500 coins 
(midpoint = 500, range = 0). In the Uncertainty condition, the participants read that the 
resource would contain at least 100 and at most 900 coins (midpoint = 500, range = 
800). In the Uncertainty condition, participants learned that afterwards the exact size 
of the common resource would be randomly drawn from the uniform distribution by a 
computer (i.e., participants were told that each possible resource size had an equal 
chance of being drawn from the range).
After the participants had read the instructions of the common resource 
dilemma, three practice questions were posed to ensure comprehension of the social 
dilemma situation. For example, participants were asked how much group members 
would earn if the total group harvest would exceed the size of the common resource. 
Ninety-seven percent of all participants answered all three questions correctly. After 
each question, the correct answer was disclosed and the most important characteristics 
of the situation were repeated.
 Overuse Feedback. After the participants had made their harvesting decisions 
we included some fi ller questions. We told them that these questions were posed to give 
all group members enough time to make their harvesting decisions. Additionally, we told 
them that meanwhile the computer would calculate whether the common resource had 
been depleted or not. Filling in these questions took about a minute. Subsequently, the 
participants learned that all group members had made their harvesting decisions and 
that the computer had calculated whether the common resource had been depleted. 
All participants received bogus feedback indicating that the total group harvest was 
larger than the amount available in the common resource and that therefore no-one 
would receive any money. In other words, the participants learned that the common 
resource dilemma had resulted in overuse. Immediately after that, the negative affect 
questions were posed.
Questions about Negative Affect. We asked participants to indicate on seven-
point scales to what extent they experienced six negative affective reactions towards 
their fellow group members (i.e., angry, frustrated, irritated, indignant, agitated and 
hostile; 1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). These items showed good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .92) and were aggregated to form one scale of negative affect with 
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higher scores denoting stronger negative affective reactions.
Questions about Causal Attributions. Although the main aim of the present 
study was to investigate to what extent participants attributed overuse to their fellow 
group members, we also asked them to what extent they attributed this overuse to the 
uncertainty of the situation. Thus, after participants had received the overuse feedback, 
we asked them to what extent they thought that the overuse was caused by their fellow 
group members’ choice behavior. To do so, we asked participants two questions: 
namely (a) to what extent they thought their fellow group members were responsible 
for the overuse, and (b) to what extent they thought their fellow group members had 
caused the overuse (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). These two questions showed good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .88) and were aggregated to form one attribution 
measure with higher scores denoting stronger attributions to fellow group members. 
Additionally, we asked participants to what extent they attributed the overuse to the 
uncertainty of the situation (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so).
Results
Checks. The manipulation of resource size uncertainty was checked by 
asking participants to indicate how uncertain they were about the size of the resource 
(1 = not uncertain at all; 7 = very uncertain). An ANOVA on this measure yielded a highly 
signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 829.75, p < .001, η2 
= .87. As expected, resource size uncertainty was higher in the Uncertainty condition 
(M = 6.36) than in the Certainty condition (M = 1.33). These results show that we 
successfully manipulated resource size uncertainty.
The induction of overuse feedback was checked by asking participants 
whether the feedback they had received indicated that their group’s collective harvest 
had exceeded the size of the resource or not (1 = yes; 2 = no). All participants correctly 
indicated that their group had exceeded the common resource which shows that our 
induction of overuse was successful.
 Individual Harvests. An ANOVA on participants’ individual harvests did not 
yield a signifi cant effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = .001, p = .98, η2 
< .001. In the two Resource Size Uncertainty conditions, participants harvested 
roughly the same number of coins from the common resource (i.e., Uncertainty: 
M = 104.36; SD = 86.97; Certainty: M = 103.98; SD = 52.61).18
Negative Affective Reactions. An ANOVA on the aggregated negative affect 
18  Although not relevant to our reasoning, it may be interesting to note that in accordance with earlier research 
(e.g., Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 1999b; Rapoport et al., 1992), we found that the variance 
of participants’ harvests was higher in the uncertainty condition than in the certainty condition. What we did not 
fi nd, however, was the over-harvesting effect that is usually found under environmental uncertainty. This might 
be due to the fact that in earlier studies uncertainty was manipulated within participants, whereas in the present 
chapter it was manipulated between participants.
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measure yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 
4.47, p < .05, η2 = .04. In agreement with Hypothesis 5.1, Participants showed less 
negative affective reactions towards their fellow group members under Uncertainty 
(M = 3.17) than under Certainty (M = 4.07). See Table 5.1 for the means involved in 
this analysis.








Note. Higher scores denote stronger mean affective reactions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
Means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (p < .01, t-test).
Causal Attributions of Overuse. We asked participants two questions to 
indicate to what extent they thought the overuse was caused by their fellow group 
members’ harvesting behavior. An ANOVA on the aggregated attribution measure 
yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 13.81, 
p < .001, η2 = .10. In agreement with Hypothesis 5.2, participants attributed the overuse less to 
their fellow group members under Uncertainty (M = 4.93) than under Certainty (M = 5.91).19
Additionally, we asked participants to indicate to what extent they thought the 
overuse was caused the uncertainty of the situation. An ANOVA on this measure again 
yielded a signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(2, 120) = 4.28, p < .05, 
η2 = .05. As expected, participants attributed the overuse more to the situation under 
Uncertainty (M = 5.26) than under Certainty (M = 4.14). See Table 5.2 for the means 
involved in these analyses.














Note. Higher scores denote stronger mean attributions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. For each 
row, means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (p < .05, t-tests). 
19  It is important to note here that people’s attributions may also be infl uenced by their own harvesting decisions 
(e.g., whether they have adhered to the equal division rule themselves). We will elaborate on this issue later on 
in this chapter.
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 Mediation Analysis. To test whether participants’ negative affective reactions 
could be explained their attributions of the overuse to their fellow group members (see 
Hypothesis 5.3), we performed a mediation analysis with Resource Size Uncertainty (i.e., 
No vs. Yes) as the independent variable, affective reactions as the dependent variable 
and attributions to the choice behavior of fellow group members as the mediator (cf. 
Baron & Kenny, 1986). We fi rst performed a regression analysis on affective reactions 
with resource size uncertainty as the predictor. This analysis showed that resource 
size uncertainty signifi cantly predicted participants’ affective reactions, β = -.264, p 
< .01. Second, we performed a regression analysis on the mediator with resource 
size uncertainty as the predictor. This analysis showed that resource size uncertainty 
also signifi cantly predicted participants’ attributions to their fellow group members’ 
choice behavior, β = -.290, p < .01. Third, a regression analysis with both resource 
size uncertainty and the mediator as independent variables showed that the mediator 
signifi cantly predicted participants’ affective reactions, β = .540, p < .001, whereas the 
effect of resource size uncertainty disappeared and became non-signifi cant when the 
mediator was included, β = -.090, p = .26. Moreover, a Sobel test showed that the 
decrease of this latter effect was signifi cant (Sobel test value = -3.27, p < .01). Altogether, 
these regression analyses indicate that the effect of resource size uncertainty on 
participants’ affective reactions was signifi cantly mediated by participants’ attributions 
to their group members’ choice behavior, which is fully in line with hypothesis 5.3.20
Discussion
 The results of Study 5.1 support our fi rst set of hypotheses. Under resource 
size certainty participants showed stronger negative affective reactions towards their 
fellow group members than under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.1). 
Additionally, under resource size certainty participants attributed the overuse more 
to their fellow group members than under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.2). 
Moreover, the effect of uncertainty on participants’ negative affective reactions was 
mediated by their attributions of the overuse to their fellow group members (Hypothesis 
5.3). Additionally, we found that under resource size certainty overuse was attributed 
less to the situation than under resource size uncertainty. 
20  We also tested whether the effect of uncertainty on affective responses to fellow group members was 
mediated by participants’ attributions of overuse to the uncertainty of the situation. This was not the case. This 
fi nding can be explained by the fact that we asked participants about the emotional reactions to their fellow 
group members and not about their emotional reactions to the situation.
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Study 5.2: Reactions to Feedback about 
Individual Harvests
The results of Study 5.1 provide a fi rst corroboration of our idea that under 
uncertainty people become less angry after overuse than under certainty. However, 
in this fi rst study we only gave participants feedback about the collective outcome of 
the social dilemma, namely that the dilemma had resulted in overuse. By doing so, 
we showed that the same negative outcome (i.e., overuse) can elicit different affective 
reactions depending on the environmental characteristics of the social dilemma. 
However, our line of reasoning suggests that people may not only respond differently 
to the same collective outcome (i.e., collective overuse) under different levels of 
environmental uncertainty, but also to the same individual harvesting decisions. That is, 
our reasoning should extend to affective reactions towards individual group members. 
More specifi cally, reactions towards an individual making the same harvesting decision 
may be different depending on whether or not there is uncertainty about the size of the 
common resource. To investigate this possibility, we performed a second study in which 
we gave participants bogus feedback about the individual harvesting decisions of their 
fellow group members (i.e., in addition to feedback that the common resource had 
been depleted). In this Study, we aimed to investigate how people would respond to 
their fellow group members when they knew exactly how much these group members 
had harvested. Would people become less angry under uncertainty (as opposed to 
certainty) towards a fellow group member who had harvested a relatively large amount? 
This question was addressed in Study 5.2.
Under resource size certainty group members who harvested relatively large 
amounts (i.e., high harvesters) have jeopardized the collective interest by not adhering 
to the equal division rule. It can thus be expected that people will become angry at 
these high harvesters under resource size certainty. After all, such high harvesters 
have probably caused the common resource to become depleted. Under resource 
size uncertainty the story is quite different. Under such uncertainty it cannot be so 
easily concluded that high harvesters have jeopardized the collective interest. When 
overuse occurs under uncertainty, it is unclear whether or not these high harvesters 
have caused the common resource to become depleted. As a consequence, it can be 
expected that people will become less angry at such high harvesters under resource 
size uncertainty than under resource size certainty.
To test this line of reasoning, in Study 5.2 we presented participants with the 
same common resource dilemma as in Study 5.1. Again, we manipulated resource 
size (un)certainty and provided standard bogus feedback indicating that the common 
resource had been depleted. However, the difference between these studies was that 
in Study 5.2 – after giving them the feedback that the resource has been depleted 
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– we also gave participants bogus feedback about the individual harvesting decisions 
of two of their fellow group members. One of these two fellow group members had 
harvested a relatively large number of coins (i.e., 150 coins), whereas the other fellow 
group member had harvested a more moderate number of coins (i.e., 100 coins).21 
Furthermore, to keep all things equal in both (un)certainty conditions, in the resource 
size uncertainty condition we also gave participants feedback that the computer had 
determined that the common resource contained 500 coins. For each of these two 
fellow group members, we asked the same negative affect and attribution questions 
as in study 5.1.
Retributive Reactions after overuse
As we mentioned before, in Study 5.2 we also investigated people’s behavioral 
responses after overuse, namely, their retributive reactions towards their fellow group 
members. Based on earlier research (e.g., Barclay et al., 2005; Stouten et al., 2006), 
we expected that the effects of overuse might extend to retributions, such as social 
exclusion and revenge. In other words, when people attribute overuse to a fellow group 
member, they may also be more inclined to punish this fellow group member for his/
her harvesting behavior. To test this expectation, we asked participants a couple of 
questions about their retributive reactions to their fellow group members.
Hypotheses
Based on the above, we formulated the following hypotheses. First, under 
resource size certainty we expected participants to show stronger negative affective 
reactions to a high harvester than under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.4). 
Second, under resource size certainty we expected participants to attribute overuse 
more to the behavior of a high harvester than under resource size uncertainty 
(Hypothesis 5.5). Third, we expected participants’ affective reactions to their fellow 
group members to be mediated by their causal attributions. The more they would 
attribute overuse to a specifi c fellow group member, the angrier they would become at 
this fellow group member (Hypothesis 5.6). Fourth, we expected participants to show 
stronger retributive reactions to a high harvester under resource size certainty than 
under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.7).
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 122 students at Leiden University 
(35 men and 87 women, M age = 21.13 years). A 2 (Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. 
21  Note that under resource size certainty this latter group member (i.e., the group member harvesting 100 
coins) has harvested one-fi fth of the common resource, and under resource size uncertainty this group member 
has harvested one-fi fth of the midpoint of the range of the uncertain common resource.
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Yes) × 2 (Feedback about Individual Harvests: 100 coins vs. 150 coins) factorial design 
with repeated measures on the latter factor was used. The participants were paid € 4 
for their participation.
Procedure. Participants were presented with the same common resource 
dilemma as in Study 5.1. Again, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
resource size uncertainty conditions (i.e., Certainty vs. Uncertainty) and participants had 
to fi ll in the same three practice questions (this time 99 % of all participants answered 
all three questions correctly). After making their harvesting decisions, participants 
received bogus feedback about the outcome of the social dilemma, namely that the 
common resource had become depleted. In this study, we also told the participants 
in the resource size uncertainty condition that the computer had determined that the 
common resource had contained 500 coins (i.e., the same resource size as in the 
resource size certainty condition). After that, they received bogus feedback about the 
individual harvesting decisions of two of their fellow group members (i.e., Feedback 
about Individual Harvests). One of these group members had harvested 100 coins, 
whereas the other one had harvested 150 coins. For each of these two group members, 
participants responded to a couple of attribution, affect and retribution questions. The 
two Feedback about Individual Harvests conditions were counter-balanced to check 
for order effects. Preliminary analyses revealed no signifi cant order effects on any of the 
dependent variables (all Fs < 1).
Results
Checks. The manipulation of resource size uncertainty was checked by asking 
participants to indicate how uncertain they were about the size of the resource (1 = not 
uncertain at all; 7 = very uncertain). An ANOVA on this measure also yielded a highly 
signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 354.82, p < .001, η2 
= .75. As expected, resource size uncertainty was lower in the Certainty condition 
(M = 1.69) than in the Uncertainty condition (M = 5.84).
The manipulation of Feedback about Individual Harvests was checked by 
asking participants how many coins were harvested by the two fellow group members 
they had received feedback about. Ninety-six % of all participants correctly indicated 
how many coins each of the two fellow group members had harvested (i.e., 100 and 150 
coins, respectively). These results indicate that all our manipulations were successful.
After participants had received feedback about the outcome of the social 
dilemma, the induction of overuse feedback was checked by asking participants 
whether the feedback they had received indicated that their group’s collective harvest 
had exceeded the size of the resource or not (1 = yes; 2 = no). All participants correctly 
indicated that their group had exceeded the common resource.
 Individual Harvests. An ANOVA on participants’ individual harvests did not 
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yield a signifi cant effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 0.02, p = .89. In both 
Resource Size Uncertainty conditions, participants harvested roughly the same amount 
of coins from the common resource (i.e., under Certainty [M = 88.46; SD = 54.45] slightly 
– though not signifi cantly - less than under Uncertainty [M = 90.59; SD = 108.93]).
Affective Reactions. In each of the two Feedback about Individual Harvests 
conditions, we asked participants about the same six negative affective reactions as in 
Study 5.1 (i.e., angry, frustrated, irritated, indignant, agitated and hostile). Participants 
were asked to indicate on seven-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so) to what 
extent they experienced these affective reactions towards the fellow group member 
they received feedback about. These six items showed good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .92) and were aggregated to form one scale of negative affect with 
higher scores denoting stronger negative affective reactions. An ANOVA on this measure 
yielded a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests, F(1, 120) = 
157.07, p < .001, η2 = .57, and a signifi cant Resource Size Uncertainty by Feedback 
about Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 120) = 47.84, p < .001, η2 = .29.
The main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated that 
participants responded more negatively to a fellow group member who had harvested 
150 coins (M = 4.83) than to a fellow group member who had harvested 100 coins 
(M = 2.00). In accordance with Hypothesis 5.4, the interaction effect showed that 
under Certainty reactions to a group member who had harvested 150 coins were 
more negative than under Uncertainty (M = 3.75 vs. 2.56, respectively). The affective 
reactions to a group member who had harvested 100 coins were close to the lower end 
of the scale, indicating that these reactions were not negative at all. However, under 
Certainty reactions to a group member who had harvested 100 coins were slightly less 
negative than under Uncertainty (M = 1.16 vs. 1.81, respectively). See Table 5.3 for the 
means involved in this analysis.
Table 5.3. Negative Affective Reactions towards a Fellow Group Member by Resource Size Uncertainty and 
Feedback about Individual Harvests (2 × 2)














Note. Higher scores denote stronger mean affective reactions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. For 
each row, means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (p < .001, t-tests).
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Causal Attributions. After participants had received bogus feedback about 
the harvesting decisions of a fellow group member (i.e., 100 vs. 150 coins), they were 
asked to what extent they thought the overuse could be attributed to the harvesting 
decision of this fellow group member. To do so, we posed the same two personal 
attribution questions as in Study 5.1. Again, these two questions showed good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .82) and were aggregated to form one attribution measure 
with higher scores denoting stronger attribution. An ANOVA on this measure yielded 
a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests, F(1, 120) = 342.58, 
p < .001, η2 = .74, and a signifi cant Resource Size Uncertainty by Feedback about 
Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 120) = 37.48, p < .001, η2 = .24. 
The main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated that 
participants attributed overuse more to a fellow group member who had harvested 
150 coins (M = 4.83) than to a fellow group member who had harvested 100 coins 
(M = 2.00). In accordance with Hypothesis 5.4, the interaction effect showed that under 
Certainty participants attributed overuse more to the behavior of a group member who 
had harvested 150 coins than under Uncertainty (M = 5.32 vs. M = 4.33, respectively). 
It should be noted that the responses to a group member who had harvested 100 coins 
were close to the lower end of the scale. However, under Certainty participants attributed 
overuse less to the group member who had harvested 100 coins than under Uncertainty 
(M = 1.56 vs. 2.44, respectively). See Table 5.4 for the means involved in this analysis.
Table 5.4. Attributions of Overuse by Resource Size Uncertainty and Feedback about Individual Harvests (2 × 2)














Note. Higher scores denote stronger mean attributions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. For each 
row, means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (p < .001, t-tests).
We also asked participants to what extent they thought the overuse was 
caused by the uncertainty of the situation (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). A between-
participants ANOVA on this measure showed a signifi cant main effect of Resource 
Size Uncertainty, F(1, 120) = 8.17, p < .01, η2 = .06, indicating that under Uncertainty 
participants attributed overuse more to the situation than under Certainty (M = 5.15 vs. 
4.13, respectively).
Mediation Analysis. As in Study 5.1, to test whether participants’ affective 
reactions could be explained by the attributions of overuse to their fellow group 
members, we performed a mediation analysis. To test this mediation (in a mixed-model 
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design with one between- and one within-participants factor) we applied a procedure 
proposed by Judd, Kenny and McClelland (2001). First, we calculated the difference 
between the affective reactions towards the fellow group member who had harvested 
100 coins and the fellow group member who had harvested 150 coins (i.e., DIF-affect). 
Second, we calculated the difference between the attributions towards the fellow 
group member who had harvested 100 coins and the fellow group member who had 
harvested 150 coins (i.e., DIF-attribution). Third, we conducted a mediation analysis 
with Resource Size Uncertainty as the predictor, DIF-attribution as the mediator, and 
DIF-affect as the dependent variable.
We fi rst performed a regression analysis on DIF-affect with resource size 
uncertainty as the predictor. This analysis showed that resource size uncertainty 
signifi cantly predicted DIF-affect, β = -.534, p < .001, indicating the interaction on affect 
we also found with the ANOVA mentioned earlier. Second, we performed a regression 
analysis on the mediator with resource size uncertainty as the predictor. This analysis 
showed that resource size uncertainty also signifi cantly predicted DIF-attribution, 
β = -.488, p < .001, indicating the interaction effect on attributions we found earlier. 
Third, a regression analysis with both resource size uncertainty and the mediator as 
independent variables showed that the mediator signifi cantly predicted DIF-affect, 
β = .484, p < .001, whereas the effect of resource size uncertainty on DIF-affect became 
smaller when the mediator was included, β = -.298, p = .001. Moreover, a Sobel test showed 
that the decrease of this latter effect was signifi cant (Sobel test value = 4.40, p < .001). 
Altogether, these regression analyses indicate that the effect of resource size uncertainty on 
DIF-affect was partially (though signifi cantly) mediated by DIF-attribution. In accordance with 
Hypothesis 5.6, these results show that participants’ negative affective reactions can (at least 
partly) be explained by the attribution of overuse to their fellow group members.
Retributive Reactions. After asking participants about their causal attributions, 
we asked them four retribution questions towards each of the two individual group 
members. Participants were asked to what extent they (a) wanted to take revenge on 
this fellow group member, (b) wanted to sanction this fellow group member, (c) wanted 
to impose a fi ne on this fellow group member, and (d) wanted to exclude this fellow 
group member from the group (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). These items showed 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .85) and were aggregated to form one 
retribution scale with higher scores denoting stronger retributive reactions.22 An ANOVA 
on this measure yielded a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests, 
F(1, 120) = 151.06, p < .001, η2 = .56, and a signifi cant Resource Size Uncertainty by 
Feedback about Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 120) = 47.84, p < .001, 
η2 = .22.
22  We also analyzed these retribution questions separately (also in Study 3). These analyses yielded similar 
results as the analysis on this aggregate retribution scale.
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The main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated that 
participants showed stronger retributive reactions to a fellow group member who had 
harvested 150 coins (M = 2.81) than to a fellow group member who had harvested 100 
coins (M = 1.28). The interaction effect showed that, in accordance with hypothesis 
5.7, under Certainty participants showed stronger retributive reactions to a fellow group 
member who had harvested 150 coins than under Uncertainty (M = 3.37 vs. 2.26). 
Although the retributive reactions to a fellow group member who had harvested 100 
coins were very low (i.e., almost 1), under Certainty participants’ retributive reactions to 
a group member who had harvested 100 coins were even lower than under Uncertainty 
(M = 1.13 vs. 1.44). See Table 5.5 for the means involved in this analysis.
Table 5.5. Retributive Reactions towards a Fellow Group Member by Resource Size Uncertainty and Feedback 
about Individual Harvests (2 × 2)














Note. Higher scores denote stronger mean retributive reactions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
For each row, means with different superscripts differ signifi cantly (p < .001, t-tests).
Discussion
 The results of Study 5.2 corroborate our second set of hypotheses. Under 
resource size certainty participants showed stronger negative affective reactions to a 
high harvester than under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.4). Additionally, under 
resource size certainty participants attributed the overuse more to a high harvester than 
under resource size uncertainty (Hypothesis 5.5). Moreover, the effect of uncertainty 
on participants’ negative affective reactions was mediated by their attributions of 
the overuse (Hypothesis 5.6). And fi nally, under resource size certainty participants 
were more inclined to punish a high harvester than under resource size uncertainty 
(Hypothesis 5.7). As in Study 5.1, in this study we also found that under resource 
size certainty overuse was attributed less to the situation than under resource size 
uncertainty.
 Although not our primary focus, it may be interesting to elaborate on 
participants’ reactions to the fellow group member who had harvested 100 coins. 
As was shown by the data of Study 5.2, the reactions to this fellow group member 
were very positive in both (un)certainty conditions. Participants were not angry at this 
fellow group member and they were not inclined to punish this group member for his/
her choice behavior. However, looking at the cell means, it should also be noted that 
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even here, reactions were affected by uncertainty, i.e., the emotional and retributive 
reactions to this fellow group member were slightly more positive under certainty than 
under uncertainty. This fi nding may be explained by the fact that under resource size 
certainty this fellow group member had adhered perfectly to the equal division rule. 
Thus, under resource size certainty participants had no reason at all to blame this 
person for the overuse. After all, this fellow group member had done the right thing (cf. 
Messick, 1993; Stouten et al., 2005), and if all group members would have done so the 
common resource would not have become depleted. As a consequence, the affective 
and retributive responses to this fellow group member were very close to the lower 
end of the scale. Under uncertainty, by contrast, it was less clear whether harvesting 
100 coins was the right thing to do (cf. De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
responses to a person who had harvested 100 coins were slightly less positive than 
under certainty (see Tables 5.3 to 5.5).
Study 5.3: Reactions from an Outside Observer
The results of Study 5.1 and 5.2 support our ideas. In these studies, 
however, participants own harvesting decisions may have infl uenced the way in which 
they responded to their fellow group members. After all, when you have harvested a 
relatively large amount yourself you may blame yourself more for the overuse, and as a 
consequence you will attribute the overuse less to your fellow group members. Therefore, 
it is important to control for participants’ own harvesting decisions in investigating their 
attributions of overuse. One way of doing so is by including participants’ individual 
harvests as a covariate into the ANOVAs on participants’ reactions in Study 5.1 and 
5.2. Therefore, we conducted all ANOVAs of Study 5.1 and 5.2 with participants’ 
individual harvests as a covariate. Although these analyses showed that there was 
indeed a negative relation between participants’ own harvests and their attributions 
of overuse (i.e., the lower their own harvests the more they attributed overuse to their 
fellow group members), including these harvests as a covariate did not alter our pattern 
of results. This analysis thus indicated that the fi ndings of our fi rst two studies could not 
be explained by participants’ own harvesting decisions.
In order to make an even stronger case, we conducted a third study in which 
the participants did not have to make harvesting decisions themselves. This third 
study was identical to Study 5.2, but now participants only observed and judged the 
harvesting decisions of the group members involved in the social dilemma. In this way, 
we excluded the possibility that participants’ judgments would be infl uenced by their 
own harvesting decisions. Moreover, in Study 5.3 we aimed to replicate the fi ndings of 
Study 5.2 to obtain additional support for Hypotheses 5.4 to 5.7.
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Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 50 students at Leiden University 
(16 men and 34 women, M age = 20.00 years). A 2 (Resource Size Uncertainty: No vs. 
Yes) × 2 (Feedback about Individual Harvests: 100 coins vs. 150 coins) factorial design 
with repeated measures on the latter factor was used. The participants were paid € 4 
for their participation.
Procedure. Participants were presented with the same common resource 
dilemma as in Studies 1 and 2. Again, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two resource size uncertainty conditions (i.e., Certainty vs. Uncertainty) and 
participants had to fi ll in the same three practice questions as in the previous two studies 
(this time 98 % of all participants answered all three questions correctly). This time the 
participants did not have to make a harvesting decision themselves, but we told them 
that it was their task to judge the harvesting decisions of the group members involved 
in the common resource dilemma. Again, we told the participants that the common 
resource had become depleted. As in Study 5.2, we also told the participants in the 
resource size uncertainty condition that the computer had determined that the common 
resource contained 500 coins (which is the same resource size as in the resource size 
certainty condition). As in Study 5.2, they received bogus feedback about the individual 
harvesting decisions of two of the group members (i.e., Feedback about Individual 
Harvests: 100 vs. 150 coins). For each of these two group members, participants were 
asked respond to the same affect, attribution and retribution questions as in Study 
5.2. The two Feedback about Individual Harvests conditions were counter-balanced to 
check for order effects. No signifi cant order effects were found (all Fs < 1).
Results
Checks. The same checks were administered as in Study 5.2. First, an ANOVA 
on the manipulation check of resource size uncertainty yielded a highly signifi cant main 
effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, F(1, 48) = 89.89, p < .001, η2 = .65. As expected, 
uncertainty was lower in the Certainty condition (M = 1.82) than in the Uncertainty 
condition (M = 5.91). Second, ninety-fi ve % of all participants correctly indicated how 
many coins both group members had harvested (i.e., 100 vs. 150 coins, respectively). 
These results show that both manipulations were successful. Third, all participants 
correctly indicated that their group had exceeded the common resource.
Affective Reactions. An ANOVA on the aggregated affect measure (Cronbach’s 
α = .95) yielded a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests, F(1, 48) 
= 90.69, p < .001, η2 = .65, and a signifi cant Resource Size Uncertainty by Feedback 
about Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 48) = 24.38, p < .001, η2 = .34. The 
main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated that participants responded 
more negatively to a group member who had harvested 150 coins (M = 3.86) than to a 
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group member who had harvested 100 coins (M = 1.86). In accordance with Hypothesis 
5.4, the interaction showed that under Certainty reactions to a group member who had 
harvested 150 coins were more negative than under Uncertainty (M = 4.22 vs. 3.40, 
respectively). As in Study 5.2, the affective reactions to a fellow group member who 
had harvested 100 coins were not negative at all. However, under Certainty reactions 
to this group member were slightly less negative than under Uncertainty (M = 1.36 vs. 
2.49, respectively).
Attributions. An ANOVA on the aggregated attribution measure (Cronbach’s α 
= .92) yielded a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests, F(1, 48) 
= 105.51, p < .001, η2 = .69, and a signifi cant Resource Size Uncertainty by Feedback 
about Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 48) = 31.36, p < .001, η2 = .40. The 
main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated that participants attributed 
overuse more to a group member who had harvested 150 coins (M = 5.21) than to a 
group member who had harvested 100 coins (M = 2.69). In accordance with Hypothesis 
5.5, the interaction effect showed that under Certainty participants attributed overuse 
more to the behavior of a group member who had harvested 150 coins than under 
Uncertainty (M = 5.33 vs. M = 5.06, respectively). As in Study 5.2, the attributions of 
overuse to a fellow group member who had harvested 100 coins were very close to 
the lower end of the scale. However, under Certainty participants attributed overuse 
slightly less to the choice behavior of this group member than under Uncertainty (M = 
1.68 vs. 3.98, respectively).
As in Study 5.1 and 5.2, we also asked participants to what extent they thought 
the overuse was caused by the uncertainty of the situation. A between-participants 
ANOVA on this measure showed a signifi cant main effect of Resource Size Uncertainty, 
F(1, 48) = 12.81, p < .05, η2 = .12, indicating that under Uncertainty participants attributed 
overuse more to the situation than under Certainty (M = 5.59 vs. 4.57, respectively).
Mediation Analysis. In order to test the predicted mediation we applied the 
same procedure as in Study 5.2. First, we showed that resource size uncertainty 
signifi cantly predicted DIF-affect, β = -.505, p < .001, indicating the interaction on 
affect we also found with the ANOVA mentioned earlier. Second, we showed that 
resource size uncertainty also signifi cantly predicted DIF-attribution, β = -.540, p < 
.001, indicating the interaction effect on attributions we found earlier. Third, we showed 
that the mediator signifi cantly predicted DIF-affect, β = .653, p < .001, whereas the 
effect of resource size uncertainty on DIF-affect became smaller and non-signifi cant 
when the mediator was included, β = -.152, p = .09 (Sobel test value = 5.93, p < .001). 
In accordance with Hypothesis 5.6, these regression analyses thus indicate that the 
effect of resource size uncertainty on DIF-affect was fully mediated by DIF-attribution, 
which implies that participants’ negative affective reactions can be explained by the 
attributions of overuse to their fellow group members.
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Retributive Reactions. An ANOVA on the aggregated retribution measure 
(Cronbach’s α = .86) yielded a signifi cant main effect of Feedback about Individual 
Harvests, F(1, 48) = 61.25, p < .001, η2 = .56, and a signifi cant Resource Size 
Uncertainty by Feedback about Individual Harvests interaction effect, F(1, 48) = 11.01, 
p < .01, η2 = .19. The main effect of Feedback about Individual Harvests indicated 
that participants showed stronger retributive reactions to a group member who had 
harvested 150 coins (M = 3.40) than to a group member who had harvested 100 
coins (M = 1.70). In accordance with Hypothesis 5.7, the interaction effect showed that 
under Certainty participants showed stronger retributive reactions to a group member 
who had harvested 150 coins than under Uncertainty (M = 3.63 vs. 3.10, respectively). 
As in Study 5.2, participants’ retributive reactions to a fellow group member who had 
harvested 100 coins were very low. However, under Certainty participants’ retributive 
reactions to this group were slightly lower than under Uncertainty (M = 1.33 vs. 2.17, 
respectively).
Discussion
In Study 5.3, we fully replicated the fi ndings of Study 5.2. By focusing on the 
judgments of an outside observer, we again found strong support for Hypotheses 5.4 
to 5.7. These fi ndings clearly show that our ideas still hold when the participants do 
not make harvesting decisions themselves, and that these ideas are also applicable to 
outside observers. By showing this, we demonstrated how pervasive our effects are. 
Evidently, people can become angry at high harvesters and are willing to punish these 
high harvesters even when their own outcomes are not at stake. Again, it was shown 
that these reactions were stronger under certainty than under uncertainty.
General Discussion
The results of our three experimental studies strongly corroborate our hypotheses. 
Our fi rst study corroborates our fi rst set of hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 5.1 to 5.3). We found 
that under resource size certainty people show stronger negative affective reactions after 
overuse because they attribute this negative outcome more to their fellow group members’ 
choice behavior than under resource size uncertainty. Moreover, in accordance with our 
second set of hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 5.4 to 5.7), our last two studies showed that 
under certainty people respond more negatively to high harvesters than under uncertainty. 
Under resource size certainty people attribute overuse more to such high harvesters, 
they are angrier at these high harvesters, and they are more inclined to punish these high 
harvesters for their choice behavior than under resource size uncertainty. In the following, 
we will address the more general implications of these fi ndings.
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Reactions to High Harvesters under Environmental Uncertainty
 As Hardin stated (1968, p. 1244), social dilemmas inevitably lead to “ruin 
to all”. In a way, we took Hardin’s endpoint as the starting point of our research. We 
wanted to know how people react when ruin becomes reality. More specifi cally, we 
focused on how people responded affectively after overuse. We showed that these 
reactions were less negative under resource size uncertainty than under resource 
size certainty. By doing so, we demonstrated that, depending on the environmental 
characteristics of the social dilemma, the same negative outcome (i.e., overuse) can 
lead to different affective reactions. Moreover, besides focusing on how people react 
to the overuse itself (i.e., overuse as an outcome), we also investigated how people 
responded to the individual harvesting decisions of their fellow group members. In line 
with our expectations, our results showed that under resource size uncertainty people 
become less angry at group members who harvest relatively large amounts and that 
they also show milder retributive reactions to such high harvesters than under resource 
size certainty. At this point, it may be interesting to relate these fi ndings to suggestions 
done in other studies on environmental uncertainty.
In earlier papers on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas (e.g., De 
Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; Gustafsson, 1999a, b; Hine & Gifford, 1996; Rapoport et 
al., 1992), it was repeatedly argued that group members may use such uncertainty 
to further their own self-interest. For instance, in one of our earlier studies (De 
Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006), we showed that under resource size uncertainty proselfs 
(i.e., people with a dispositional preference to further their self-interest) harvested larger 
amounts than under resource size certainty. We explained this fi nding by arguing that 
under resource size uncertainty proselfs could justify relatively high harvests by arguing 
that they thought there would be more than enough money in the uncertain common 
resource (also referred to as egoism-justifi cation; see Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 1999b). 
Proselfs seemed to think that under resource size uncertainty they could get away with 
harvesting such relatively large amounts. However, the question still remained as to 
whether this was really the case: Can people really get away with high harvests under 
resource size uncertainty?
The present research provides a tentative answer to this question. Our results 
show that under resource size uncertainty group members respond more mildly to 
high harvesters than under resource size certainty. After all, under uncertainty group 
members cannot simply determine whether high harvesters have caused the common 
resource to become depleted and therefore they become less angry at these high 
harvesters than under certainty. These fi ndings suggest that high harvesters can 
indeed more easily get away with their “greedy” harvesting behavior under resource 
size uncertainty.
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Managing an Uncertain Common Resource
The above line of reasoning also shows the importance of environmental 
uncertainty for the enforcement of the equal division rule. After all, this rule only prescribes 
an unequivocal harvest level when there is environmental certainty. In most real-life 
social dilemmas, however, there is uncertainty about the environmental characteristics 
of the dilemma. When these characteristics become uncertain – such as the resource 
size or the group size – people may not be able to determine whether their fellow group 
members have violated this rule (cf. De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). In line with this 
reasoning, our fi ndings suggest that under such circumstances it is more diffi cult for 
group members to enforce the use of this rule (e.g., by means of retributions), even if 
they have full information about their fellow group members’ harvesting decisions.
Thus, when the task environment does not allow for a division rule to prescribe 
an unequivocal amount to harvest, group members must fi nd another way to effi ciently 
manage the common resource. According to Ostrom (1990), group members (referred 
to as “appropriators”) must then defi ne the boundaries of the common resource 
themselves. In other words, based on the “local” conditions of the common resource, 
they must agree on how much each group member is allowed to harvest from the 
common resource. However, in many social dilemmas the group members cannot 
communicate with one another and therefore it is impossible for them to agree on 
an “appropriate” amount to harvest. In the absence of communication, resource size 
uncertainty may thus hamper the enforcement of division rules, which jeopardizes 
the collective interest by increasing the chance that the common resource becomes 
depleted.
Earlier Research on Causal Attributions and Environmental Uncertainty
 At this point, it may be interesting to relate the fi ndings of the present research 
to fi ndings from a study by Rutte, Wilke and Messick (1987). Rutte et al. investigated 
attributions of scarcity and abundance in a common resource dilemma. In contrast 
to our research – in which we used a simultaneous protocol of play – Rutte et al. 
used a sequential protocol of play (i.e., harvesting decisions were made sequentially). 
Participants were told that as a member of a six person group, they themselves were the 
fi fth member to harvest an amount from the common resource. In this experiment, Rutte 
et al. also manipulated resource size uncertainty asymmetrically, i.e., in the uncertainty 
condition of this experiment only the fi rst four group members were uncertain about the 
size of the common resource. Scarcity and abundance were manipulated by varying 
the amount of money left for the last two group members (i.e., group members 5 and 
6). In the scarcity condition, there was less than an equal share left for each of the 
last two group members, whereas in the abundance condition there was more than 
an equal share left for each of the last two group members. In accordance with our 
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fi ndings, Rutte et al. found that in the certainty condition participants indicated that their 
fellow group members were more responsible for the outcome than in the uncertainty 
condition.
The above fi ndings – which demonstrate the relation between environmental 
uncertainty and causal attributions – are in agreement with our line of reasoning (see 
also Wit, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 1989, on causal attributions of a leader’s success or failure 
under environmental (un)certainty). However, Rutte et al. (1987) did not investigate how 
participants reacted affectively to fellow group members under scarcity and abundance. 
As we mentioned earlier, until recently (see Stouten et al., 2005, 2006, for exceptions) 
very little research has been done on emotions in social dilemmas. However, such 
emotional reactions can have important behavioral consequences. After all, research 
has shown that emotions can have a substantial impact on people’s decisions. For 
instance, we argued and showed that anger-related emotions can extend to retributive 
reactions, such as social exclusion and revenge. Therefore, it is important to not only 
focus on how people attribute overuse, but to also focus on people’s affective and 
retributive reactions towards fellow group members after such overuse.
We showed that causal attributions of overuse can affect people’s affective 
and retributive reactions to their fellow group members. When group members attribute 
overuse more to their fellow group members, they become angrier at these fellow 
group members and they also show stronger retributive reactions to these fellow group 
members. By showing this, we demonstrated how and when attributions of overuse 
can be important. After all, attributions of overuse can have serious consequences for 
the group members this outcome is attributed to.
Conclusions
 In the present chapter, we investigated how people deal with the “tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Specifi cally, we focused on people’s affective and 
retributive responses after overuse. By doing so, the present research has generated 
a number of new insights. First, we demonstrated that resource size uncertainty has 
a substantial impact on how people respond affectively after overuse. Second, we 
showed that under resource size uncertainty people attribute such overuse less to 
their fellow group members than under certainty. Third, we investigated how these 
attributions affected people’s affective and retributive reactions. We showed that under 
resource size uncertainty people’s affective and retributive responses after overuse are 
less negative than under certainty. Altogether, these fi ndings underline the importance 
of environmental uncertainty by demonstrating that such uncertainty plays a crucial role 
in how people respond after overuse in social dilemmas.
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Chapter 6
General Discussion
 The main objective of the present dissertation was to provide a more 
comprehensive perspective on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas. I argued 
that environmental uncertainty hampers the application of the equal division rule. 
In accordance with this idea, the present dissertation showed that environmental 
uncertainty affects several interpersonal processes that are related to the application of 
this rule. More specifi cally, environmental uncertainty has consequences for three key 
aspects of interpersonal processes in social dilemmas, namely, for (a) how people tacitly 
coordinate their harvesting decisions, (b) how they justify their harvesting decisions 
to others, and (c) how they respond affectively to their fellow group members after 
overuse.
 In this chapter, I will briefl y summarize the most important fi ndings of the 
experimental studies that were presented in the previous chapters. However, the main 
aim of this chapter is to put these fi ndings in a broader perspective. For this purpose, 
I will elaborate on the general implications of these fi ndings and I will give suggestions 
for future research.
Summary of the Main Findings
 Chapter 2 and 3 investigated how environmental uncertainty affects tacit 
coordination. These chapters focused on the infl uences of the equal division rule and 
social value orientations under resource size uncertainty (Chapter 2) and under group 
size uncertainty (Chapter 3). The fi ndings showed that under environmental certainty 
proselfs as well as prosocials tacitly coordinated their decisions by adhering to the equal 
division rule, whereas under environmental uncertainty (i.e., resource size uncertainty 
or group size uncertainty) proselfs harvested more from the common resource than 
prosocials.
 In Chapter 4, two experimental studies were conducted to investigate how 
people justify their harvesting decisions under resource size (un)certainty. These studies 
showed that under certainty participants indicated that harvests adhering to the equal 
division rule were easiest to justify and they adhered to this rule when they had to justify 
their harvesting decisions to their fellow group members. By contrast, under uncertainty 
participants indicated that relatively low harvests were easiest to justify and they restricted 
their harvests when they had to justify their decisions to their fellow group members.
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 In Chapter 5, three experimental studies were conducted to investigate how 
people react affectively after overuse under resource size (un)certainty. These studies 
demonstrated that under certainty participants’ affective and retributive reactions after 
overuse were more negative than under uncertainty. Furthermore, the fi ndings showed 
that this can be explained by the fact that under certainty participants attribute overuse 
more to the harvesting behavior of their fellow group members than under uncertainty.
General Implications
A central theme of the present dissertation is that the equal division rule is an 
important division rule in social dilemmas. But why is this rule so important? According 
to Messick (1993), the equal division rule has three characteristics that make it highly 
useful and appealing. First, the rule is easy to implement and requires little cognitive 
effort. Second, the rule promotes group effi ciency because it generates clear decisions 
which often lead to successful coordination. And third, decisions that conform to this 
rule can be easily justifi ed because they are in accordance with a general norm of 
fairness. Because of these appealing characteristics it is not surprising that people 
often base their harvesting decisions on the equal division rule (e.g., Allison, McQueen, 
& Schaerfl , 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; Van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1993, 1995; Van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999).
However, in the present dissertation I also argued that there are limits to the 
applicability of the equal division rule. In other words, the rule cannot always be so 
easily applied (for articles on the limits on applying the equal division rule, see Allison 
et al., 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990). After all, in order to calculate an equal share 
people need specifi c and accurate information about the task environment of the 
social dilemma. More specifi cally, in a common resource dilemma group members 
need to know exactly how large the common resource is and how many people have 
access to the common resource. In many real-life social dilemmas, such environmental 
characteristics are uncertain and therefore the application of the equal division rule is 
hampered. Based on this line of reasoning, I argued that under such environmental 
uncertainty the three useful characteristics of the equal division cannot be employed. 
The present dissertation focused on the various consequences of this notion.
Environmental Uncertainty and Tacit Coordination
 The fi rst theme this dissertation focused on was tacit coordination. What are 
the consequences of environmental uncertainty for effi cient coordination? Can people 
still tacitly coordinate their harvesting decisions under environmental uncertainty? 
To answer these questions it was useful to fi rst take a closer look at the concept of 
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tacit coordination. This concept was developed by the famous economist and Nobel 
prize winner Thomas Schelling (1960). Schelling argued that even in the absence of 
communication people can often effi ciently coordinate their decisions. To illustrate this, 
he gave an example of two people who want to meet each other in New York City 
without having a prior understanding on where and when to meet. Where would one 
go and at what time? Schelling asked participants this question and found that the 
majority of the people answered that they would go to Central Station at 12.00 noon. If 
people would indeed act accordingly this would mean that tacit coordination would be 
highly effi cient.
 Van Dijk and colleagues (e.g., Van Dijk, De Cremer, & De Kwaadsteniet, in 
preparation; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995, 1996; Van Dijk et al., 1999) applied this concept of 
tacit coordination to social dilemmas. They argued that in social dilemmas people can 
effi ciently coordinate their choice behavior by anchoring their decisions on so-called 
coordination rules. To use these coordination rules people use specifi c cues from the 
task environment of the social dilemma (Van Dijk et al., 1999). When people use the same 
cues to base their decisions on, they can effi ciently coordinate their choice behavior. 
According to Schelling, such a common understanding is crucial for tacit coordination. 
For tacit coordination to work, it is essential that people “read the same message in 
the common situation, to identify the one course of action” (Schelling, 1960, p. 54). In 
the present dissertation, I argued that it is exactly this common understanding that is 
missing under environmental uncertainty. Since under such uncertainty people cannot 
so easily apply the equal division rule – and they might even have different ideas about 
what constitutes an equal share (see Chapter 4) – there is no common understanding 
of how much to harvest. As a consequence, tacit coordination is hampered under 
environmental uncertainty.
 Based on the above, I concluded that under environmental uncertainty people 
cannot (so easily) base their harvesting behavior on coordination rules such as the equal 
division rule. But what do people base their decisions on under such uncertainty? To 
answer this question, I connected Schelling’s concept of tacit coordination to Snyder 
and Ickes’ (1985) framework of weak vs. strong situations. Based on this framework, 
situations that provide salient cues for tacit coordination – such as social dilemmas with 
environmental certainty – can be defi ned as “strong” situations. By contrast, situations 
that do not provide such salient cues – such as social dilemmas with environmental 
uncertainty – can be defi ned as “weak” situations. In strong situations, people can 
tacitly coordinate their choice behavior by anchoring their decisions on these salient 
environmental cues. By contrast, in weak situations Snyder and Ickes argued that 
people base their decisions on relevant dispositional factors instead of cues from the 
environment. By applying this framework to the topic of environmental uncertainty, 
the present studies demonstrated that whereas under environmental certainty people 
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can tacitly coordinate their choice behavior by applying the equal division rule, under 
uncertainty they base their decisions on their own social value orientations, inducing 
proselfs to harvest more than prosocials. These fi ndings clearly show that Snyder and 
Ickes’ framework can be fruitfully used to explain and predict choice behavior in social 
dilemmas (cf. Roch & Samuelson, 1997; Van Lange, 1997) and perhaps also in other 
settings in which tacit coordination is hampered, such as pure coordination games 
with ambiguous focal points (see e.g., Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994). Moreover, 
these fi ndings show that both tacit coordination and personality differences have their 
boundaries, and that the weak-strong framework helps to determine which one of 
these two factors has the strongest infl uence on people’s choice behavior in social 
dilemmas.
Is Uncertainty Always Detrimental?
 The bulk of earlier studies on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas 
(e.g., Budescu et al., 1990, 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1999a, 1999b; Rapoport et al., 
1992) suggest that environmental uncertainty is detrimental to the collective interest. 
More specifi cally, these studies repeatedly demonstrated that resource size uncertainty 
induces people to harvest excessively from the common resource. Based on these 
fi ndings, social dilemma researchers drew the conclusion that environmental uncertainty 
leads to non-cooperation, which in turn jeopardizes the collective interest by increasing 
the chance of the common resource becoming depleted. Although this over-harvesting 
effect was replicated in the present dissertation (see Studies 2.1 and 4.2), the research 
in this dissertation also showed that environmental uncertainty does not always lead 
to non-cooperation. Based on this fi nding, I argued that environmental uncertainty 
does not only have detrimental effects, but that uncertainty might sometimes even be 
benefi cial to the collective interest. In the following, I will elaborate on the detrimental 
and benefi cial effects of environmental uncertainty.
 Chapter 2 focused on how resource size uncertainty interacted with social 
value orientations. This topic was investigated by using the same experimental 
common resource dilemma as the one used by Budescu, Rapoport, Suleiman and 
colleagues (e.g., Budescu et al., 1990, 1995; Rapoport et al., 1992; Suleiman et al., 
1996) and Gustafsson, Biel and Gärling (1999a, 1999b). Resource size uncertainty 
was manipulated in the same way as in these earlier studies, namely by varying the 
range of the size of the common resource. As expected, the over-harvesting effect 
that was found in these earlier studies was replicated, indicating that resource size 
uncertainty is indeed detrimental to the collective interest. However, what the present 
dissertation adds to these earlier studies is the fi nding that not all people over-harvest 
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under environmental uncertainty. More specifi cally, Chapter 2 showed that only proselfs 
increased their individual harvests under resource size uncertainty, whereas prosocials’ 
harvests remained unaffected by such uncertainty. These fi ndings indicate that the 
over-harvesting effect that was repeatedly found in earlier research was probably 
caused by proselfs’ non-cooperative choice behavior. Based on these fi ndings, it can 
be concluded that resource size uncertainty may only be detrimental to the collective 
interest when (at least some of) the people involved in the social dilemma have a proself 
orientation.
 Chapter 3 focused on another type of environmental uncertainty than resource 
size uncertainty, namely, group size uncertainty. This type of uncertainty has – until 
now – only been investigated in one earlier experimental study (Au & Ngai, 2003). 
Au and Ngai manipulated group size uncertainty in a single-trial common resource 
dilemma. Interestingly, they found that group size uncertainty did not induce over-
harvesting. More specifi cally, they found that group size uncertainty induced a decrease 
in the collective harvest, suggesting that not all types of environmental uncertainty are 
necessarily detrimental to the collective interest. However, it is important to note that 
Au and Ngai did not fi nd an effect of group size uncertainty on participants’ individual 
harvests. In Chapter 3, I conducted an experimental study in which participants’ 
social value orientations were measured before they were faced with a social dilemma 
with group size (un)certainty. This study (Study 3.1) showed that under uncertainty 
participants mean individual harvests were lower than under certainty, indicating that 
group size uncertainty induces cooperation. Furthermore, this study demonstrated that 
prosocials responded more strongly to group size uncertainty than proselfs. Prosocials 
decreased their individual harvests under uncertainty, whereas proselfs’ harvests 
remained unaffected by uncertainty. These fi ndings suggest that not all different types 
of environmental uncertainty have the same detrimental effect on cooperation. Group 
size uncertainty even seems to be benefi cial to the collective, especially when (most of) 
the group members have a prosocial orientation.
 Chapter 4 focused on how people justify their harvesting decisions under 
resource size uncertainty. To do so, in Study 4.2, accountability was manipulated under 
varying levels of resource size uncertainty. This study showed that under uncertainty 
accountability induced participants to decrease their mean individual harvests. As a 
consequence, no over-harvesting effect was found in the uncertainty-accountability 
condition. This fi nding indicates that the detrimental effects of resource size uncertainty 
may disappear when group members are held accountable for their harvesting 
decisions. In other words, accountability may provide a solution for the detrimental 
effects of resource size uncertainty. The fi ndings of Chapter 4 thus clearly show that 
resource size uncertainty does not necessarily lead to over-harvesting.
 Although the above-mentioned fi ndings suggest that environmental uncertainty 
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is not always detrimental to collective interests, it should be noted that this conclusion 
was based on analyses of participants’ mean harvests. However, as already argued in 
Chapters 3 and 4, in order to investigate how environmental uncertainty affects tacit 
coordination it is important to not only focus on the mean harvest level – which is the 
way most social dilemma researchers analyze participants’ choice behavior – but to 
also look at the variance in participants’ harvests. In all of the studies in this dissertation 
– including the ones that showed that uncertainty does not lead to non-cooperation 
(i.e., Studies 3.1 and 4.2) – environmental uncertainty increased the variance of people’s 
harvesting decisions. This fi nding is important because variability constitutes a potential 
threat to successful coordination, especially in small group settings. In small groups, 
the presence of only a few over-harvesters may be enough to harm the collective 
interest by increasing the chance that the common resource becomes depleted. Small 
harvests, on the other hand, may harm the collective interest by increasing the chance 
that the common resource is underused. As a consequence, high variability in individual 
harvests hardly ever leads to optimal or effi cient use of the common resource. This idea 
was supported by the Monte Carlo analysis that was conducted in Chapter 4. Moreover, 
this reasoning is also fully in line with Schelling’s notion that a common understanding 
is necessary for successful coordination (Schelling, 1960), and that environmental 
uncertainty undermines such a common understanding (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, this analysis clearly demonstrates that, in order to assess the infl uence of 
environmental uncertainty on tacit coordination, it is important to not only look at the 
means but also at the variance of people’s choice behavior.
 In the previous paragraphs, the effects of environmental uncertainty on 
people’s harvesting decisions were discussed. However, the last empirical chapter of 
this dissertation (i.e., Chapter 5) did not focus on people’s harvesting decisions, but 
primarily focused on how environmental uncertainty infl uenced people’s affective and 
retributive reactions after overuse. In short, the fi ndings of this chapter demonstrated 
that under uncertainty people reacted much more mildly to such overuse than under 
certainty. More specifi cally, under uncertainty people became less “angry” at their 
fellow group members – even when these group members had harvested relatively 
large amounts – and they were less inclined to punish these fellow group members 
after such overuse than under certainty. These fi ndings show that under environmental 
uncertainty people respond less negatively to negative outcomes such as overuse, 
which again suggests that environmental uncertainty does not always and exclusively 
have negative effects. However, it should be noted that the fact that under uncertainty 
people react less negatively to their fellow group members may in turn be detrimental to 
the collective interest. After all, not punishing fellow group members for overuse – and 
the non-cooperative choice behavior that may have caused it – might have negative 
consequences in the future.
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 Taken together, by applying a new perspective to study the effects of 
environmental uncertainty, the present dissertation clearly shows that the effects of 
environmental uncertainty are indeed more differentiated than suggested in earlier 
research. By focusing on individual differences (social value orientations), different types 
of uncertainty (resource size uncertainty and group size uncertainty), accountability, 
and affective and retributive reactions after overuse, I was able to show repeatedly that 
environmental uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental to collective interests.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
 Although the research presented in this dissertation has generated a number 
of new insights on the topic of environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas, there 
are still themes that are related to this topic that were not addressed. Therefore, I 
will now elaborate on the limitations of the present dissertation and I will give some 
suggestions for future research on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas. First, I 
will discuss how the effects of environmental uncertainty – such as the effects observed 
in the present dissertation – can be investigated by focusing on other types of social 
dilemmas and other types of environmental uncertainty. Second, I will present some 
ideas about where the research on environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas might 
be heading in the future.
The present dissertation has primarily focused on the effects of environmental 
uncertainty in common resource dilemmas. Although it is very important that this type 
of social dilemma is studied and understood (see Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, 
& Walker, 1995), there is another type of social dilemma, namely the public good 
dilemma, which has received little attention in the present dissertation. Public good 
dilemmas are social dilemmas in which a group of people can contribute endowments 
to realize a public good. Several earlier studies have shown that people often behave 
quite differently in these different types of social dilemmas (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 
1986; Parks, 1994; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), and therefore it is important to investigate 
whether the fi ndings that were obtained in the present dissertation also generalize to 
public good dilemmas. For instance, does the weak-strong framework (Snyder & Ickes, 
1985) also apply to provision point uncertainty in step-level public good dilemmas? And 
what happens to tacit coordination under uncertainty in public good dilemmas?
 There are a number of earlier studies on environmental uncertainty in public 
good dilemmas (e.g., Au, 2000; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 2000; Suleiman, Budescu, 
& Rapoport, 2001; Wit & Wilke, 1998). Interestingly, most of the effects observed in 
these studies were quite different from the effects obtained in studies on common 
resource dilemmas. For instance, none of the experimental studies on public good 
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dilemmas showed that environmental uncertainty induces non-cooperation. To give 
just one example, a study by Suleiman and colleagues (2001), in which provision point 
uncertainty was manipulated, showed that the effect of this type of environmental 
uncertainty on cooperation depended on the mean provision threshold level. In case of 
a high provision threshold (relatively hard to reach) provision point uncertainty induced 
a decrease in contributions, whereas in case of a low provision threshold (relatively easy 
to reach) participants became more cooperative under uncertainty. Although this is only 
one example, these fi ndings clearly illustrate that environmental uncertainty seems to 
have quite different effects in public good dilemmas versus common resource dilemmas. 
Moreover, the fi ndings on environmental uncertainty in public good dilemmas that were 
observed in these earlier studies do not provide a consistent picture, and it remains 
unclear how these effects differ from the ones found in studies on common resource 
dilemmas. Thus, more research is needed to address the issue of how environmental 
uncertainty affects choice behavior in different types of social dilemmas.
 The present dissertation focused on two distinct types of environmental 
uncertainty, namely, resource size uncertainty and group size uncertainty. Although 
the weak-strong framework can be applied to both types of uncertainty, the present 
studies also showed that these two types of uncertainty have very different behavioral 
effects. Whereas resource size uncertainty led to higher harvests, group size uncertainty 
induced lower harvests. These contradictory fi ndings suggest how fruitful it is to 
investigate different types of environmental uncertainty. However, until now only very 
few types of environmental uncertainty have been investigated. Experimental research 
has only focused on resource size uncertainty, group size uncertainty and provision 
point uncertainty. Further, Van Lange and colleagues (e.g., Brucks & Van Lange, 
2007; Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 
2002) have investigated the infl uence of noise in social dilemmas, which is a topic 
that is closely related to environmental uncertainty. Although these earlier studies have 
broadened our understanding of uncertainty in social dilemmas, Van Dijk et al. (2004) 
have suggested that there are many other types of environmental uncertainty that can 
also be investigated, such as uncertainty about the size of the public good, uncertainty 
about group members’ access to the common resource, and asymmetric uncertainty 
about the size of the common resource (e.g., when some members know how large 
the common resource is, whereas others do not). The effects of these unexplored 
types of uncertainty may be quite different from the effects found in earlier studies. 
For instance, in case of uncertainty about the size of the public good, optimism may 
lead to overestimation of the size of the public good, which may in turn increase 
people’s willingness to contribute (i.e., uncertainty may induce cooperation). This 
reasoning suggests that overestimation of an uncertain public good may stimulate 
cooperation, whereas the present dissertation as well as earlier research has shown 
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that overestimation of an uncertain common resource stimulates non-cooperation (see 
Chapter 2). Since these uninvestigated types of uncertainty often lead to such new 
and interesting predictions, they constitute interesting challenges for future research on 
environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.
 Earlier research on environmental uncertainty has mainly focused on how 
uncertainty infl uenced people’s harvesting decisions and their estimates of the size 
of the uncertain common resource. In the present dissertation, however, I argued 
that groups are characterized by more than just harvests and estimates. Groups 
may be characterized by a broad spectrum of interpersonal processes. Therefore, 
the present dissertation focused on how environmental uncertainty infl uences 
interpersonal processes in social dilemmas. For instance, Chapter 5 focused on how 
such uncertainty infl uenced the way in which people responded to their fellow group 
members after overuse. Specifi cally, this chapter investigated people’s negative affective 
reactions towards fellow group members. This chapter showed that such reactions are 
contingent upon the environmental characteristics of the social dilemma, i.e., under 
certainty these affective reactions were more negative than under uncertainty. In the 
social dilemma literature, research on emotions has been quite scarce. However, it is 
important to investigate the role of emotions in social dilemmas. After all, emotions can 
have a substantial impact on people’s judgments and decisions (e.g., Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2002). For instance, when people become angry at their fellow group members, 
they are more inclined to punish these group members for their non-cooperative 
behavior (Stouten et al., 2005, 2006). Moreover, the present dissertation showed that 
research on emotions can be fruitful, for it can broaden our understanding of social 
dilemmas. Therefore, it is important for social dilemma researchers to not only focus 
on the conventional dependent variables, such as people’s individual harvests or 
contributions, but also on more unconventional topics, such as the role of emotions in 
social dilemmas.
 The present dissertation aimed to generate more insights into the effects of 
environmental uncertainty on interpersonal processes in social dilemmas. Although for 
this purpose it was suffi cient to study how uncertainty works in single-trial dilemmas, 
to investigate the dynamics of such interpersonal processes it may also be useful 
to investigate what happens after the fi rst trial. After all, most groups do not cease 
to exist after one single encounter. Very few experimental studies have been done 
to investigate how environmental uncertainty affects choice behavior in multiple-trial 
settings (for exceptions, see Hine & Gifford, 1996; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). Roch and 
Samuelson (1997) showed that also in a replenishable resource dilemma an interaction 
of environmental uncertainty and social value orientations on harvests can be found 
(cf. De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006), which implies that Snyder and Ickes’ weak-strong 
framework can also be fruitfully applied to multiple-trial social dilemmas. However, 
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research should not only focus on how environmental uncertainty affects harvesting 
decisions in multiple-trial social dilemmas, but also on how repeated interactions 
between group members infl uence the interpersonal processes that were studied in 
the present dissertation.
In Chapter 5, a fi rst attempt was made to study the dynamics of such 
processes by investigating people’s affective and retributive reactions to their fellow 
group members after receiving feedback that the dilemma had resulted in overuse. 
By doing so, this chapter demonstrated that, after people have learned that the 
social dilemma has resulted in overuse, they respond more negatively to their fellow 
group members under resource size certainty than under resource size uncertainty. 
These fi ndings imply that when overuse occurs under uncertainty people’s responses 
to their fellow group members are relatively mild, which may in turn have positive 
consequences for the stability of the group. Moreover, this chapter clearly illustrates 
that people deal differently with the same negative collective outcome depending on 
whether or not the social dilemma is characterized by environmental uncertainty. An 
interesting next question would be whether these reactions extend to preferences for 
structural solutions in social dilemmas, such as the installment of sanctioning systems 
or the endorsement of leaders. Are people more willing to install a sanctioning system 
after overuse under certainty than under uncertainty? To obtain more insights into how 
people deal with environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas such questions should 
be addressed in future research.
It is my hope that future research will follow the lines set out in the present 
dissertation. As I argued in the previous paragraphs, there is still a lot of research to be 
done. First, future research could address the question as to whether earlier fi ndings 
extent to other types of social dilemmas and other types of environmental uncertainty. 
Second, future research could focus more on the interpersonal effects of environmental 
uncertainty. In the present dissertation, I made a fi rst attempt at addressing these issues. 
By doing so, I think this dissertation has indeed provided a more comprehensive view 
on the topic of environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas.
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary)
 Dit proefschrift gaat over (omgevings)onzekerheid in sociale dilemma’s. 
Sociale dilemma’s zijn situaties waarin persoonlijke belangen in strijd zijn met collectieve 
belangen. In dit soort situaties moet men dus kiezen tussen het eigenbelang (defectie) 
of het groepsbelang (coöperatie). Een voorbeeld van zo’n dilemma – en het dilemma 
waar dit proefschrift zich vooral op richt – is het resource dilemma. In dit type dilemma 
heeft een groep mensen een gezamenlijke bron tot haar beschikking. Alle individuele 
groepsleden kunnen onbeperkt consumeren uit de gezamenlijke bron, maar als ze 
met gezamenlijk te veel consumeren dan raakt deze bron uitgeput. In dat geval blijft er 
uiteindelijk voor niemand iets over. Een realistisch voorbeeld van een dergelijk dilemma 
is het probleem van overbevissing. Hoewel individuele vissers graag veel willen vissen 
om op die manier veel te verdienen, is dit vaak niet goed voor de het collectief. 
Overbevissing leidt er immers toe dat vispopulaties uitsterven, hetgeen uiteindelijk 
desastreus is voor alle vissers.
 Uit onderzoek is gebleken dat mensen toch vaak goed met dit soort dilemma’s 
om kunnen gaan. Zelfs wanneer ze niet met elkaar kunnen communiceren, kunnen 
ze hun keuzes effi ciënt op elkaar afstemmen door stilzwijgende coördinatie-regels 
te volgen (Schelling, 1960). In sociale dilemma’s gebruiken ze daarvoor bepaalde 
verdelingsregels, zoals de gelijke-verdelingsregel (zie b.v. Van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & 
Metman, 1999). Wanneer een groep van 5 mensen bijvoorbeeld de beschikking heeft 
over een gezamenlijke voorraad van 500 eenheden, dan zullen de meeste mensen 
een gelijk deel uit die voorraad nemen, namelijk 100 eenheden. Als alle groepsleden 
dit doen, dan wordt de gezamenlijke voorraad optimaal gebruikt. De voorraad wordt 
dan niet overschreden en wordt eerlijk over alle groepsleden verdeeld. Door de gelijke-
verdelingsregel te gebruiken kunnen groepsleden hun keuzes dus effi ciënt op elkaar 
afstemmen. Maar is dat afstemmen wel altijd zo eenvoudig? In het huidige proefschrift 
laat ik zien dat dit afhangt van omgevingsonzekerheid, oftewel, onzekerheid over de 
taakomgeving van een sociaal dilemma.
 In de werkelijkheid is het vaak niet precies duidelijk hoe groot de gezamenlijke 
bron is. Ook weet men vaak niet hoe groot de groep is die toegang heeft tot die bron. 
Visexperts weten bijvoorbeeld niet hoeveel vis er gevangen kan worden zonder dat 
vispopulaties daaronder lijden. Bovendien zijn de vissers zelf het vaak niet eens met de 
visquota die hun door deze experts worden opgelegd. Bij dit soort onzekerheid – genaamd 
omgevingsonzekerheid – is het dus een stuk moeilijker om te bepalen wat een gelijk deel van 
de bron is. Wat is immers een gelijk deel van een onzekere bron? Bij omgevingsonzekerheid 
kunnen groepsleden de gelijke-verdelingsregel dus niet meer gebruiken om hun keuzes op 
elkaar af te stemmen. Hoe gaan groepsleden met dit soort onzekerheid om? Deze vraag 
heb ik in het huidige proefschrift geprobeerd te beantwoorden.
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 In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 heb ik me gericht op stilzwijgende coördinatie in sociale 
dilemma’s (zie ook Schelling, 1960). Hoe coördineren mensen hun keuzes als er 
omgevingsonzekerheid is en als ze bovendien niet met elkaar kunnen communiceren? 
Zoals ik hierboven al schreef, is het in dat geval erg moeilijk om te coördineren met door 
de gelijke-verdelingsregel toe te passen. Maar waar baseren mensen hun keuzes dan 
wel op? Ik vond een antwoord op deze vraag in een theorie van Snyder en Ickes (1985). 
Snyder en Ickes stelden dat er twee soorten situaties zijn: sterke situaties en zwakke 
situaties. Sterke situaties zijn situaties waarin iedereen precies weet wat hij/zij moet 
doen, omdat deze situaties duidelijke cues geven voor welke keuze mensen het beste 
kunnen maken. In dat geval vertonen mensen vaak identiek gedrag dat gedicteerd 
wordt door de situatie. Zwakke situaties geven daarentegen geen duidelijke cues voor 
gedrag en in dat geval gaat de persoonlijkheid van mensen een grotere rol spelen. 
Mensen bepalen dan hun keuzes aan de hand van hun eigen persoonlijke voorkeuren. 
Ze gebruiken dan dus geen externe cues om hun keuzes te bepalen, maar interne 
cues.
 Toegepast op omgevingsonzekerheid in sociale dilemma’s, is een sociaal 
dilemma met zekerheid te kenmerken als een sterke situatie, en een dilemma met 
onzekerheid als een zwakke situatie. Bij zekerheid weten de groepsleden immers 
precies wat ze moeten doen om hun keuzes te coördineren, en zullen de meeste 
mensen dan ook een gelijk deel uit de bron nemen. Bij onzekerheid is dit echter een 
stuk minder duidelijk en in dat geval kunnen we dus verwachten dat mensen meer 
afgaan op hun eigen persoonlijke voorkeuren voor coöperatie dan wel defectie. 
Een veel gebruikte maat om deze voorkeuren te meten is de Decomposed Games 
Measure. Deze maat meet de zogenaamde sociale-waarde-oriëntaties van mensen, 
oftewel hun dispositionele voorkeuren voor coöperatie of defectie (zie b.v. Van Lange, 
1999). Wanneer iemand een voorkeur heeft voor coöperatie dan wordt hij/zij prosocial 
genoemd, en wanneer iemand een voorkeur heeft voor defectie dan noemt men hem/
haar proself.
 Op basis van het bovenstaande is dus te verwachten dat de meeste 
mensen (dus zowel prosocials als proselfs) bij zekerheid een gelijk deel zullen nemen, 
en dat ze bij onzekerheid hun keuzes zullen baseren op hun eigen sociale-waarde-
oriëntaties. Bij onzekerheid zullen prosocials dus minder voor zichzelf nemen dan 
proselfs. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 is deze gedachtegang getoetst aan de hand van twee 
soorten omgevingsonzekerheid, namelijk brongrootte-onzekerheid (hoofdstuk 2) en 
groepsgrootte-onzekerheid (hoofdstuk 3). Zoals verwacht bleek in beide hoofdstukken 
dat zowel prosocials als proselfs bij zekerheid een gelijk deel uit de bron namen, terwijl 
prosocials bij onzekerheid minder uit de bron namen dan proselfs.
 In hoofdstuk 4 is onderzocht hoe mensen hun keuzes aan elkaar verantwoorden 
bij omgevingsonzekerheid. Uit eerder onderzoek (zie b.v. Kerr, 1999) is gebleken dat 
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mensen de gelijke-verdelingsregel ook vaak gebruiken om hun gedrag te verantwoorden. 
Deze regel is immers niet alleen effi ciënt maar ook nog eens eerlijk (zie Messick, 1993). 
Bij zekerheid is het dus weer vrij duidelijk wat men moet doen: groepsleden kunnen 
hun gedrag verantwoorden met behulp van de gelijke-verdelingsregel en zullen dan ook 
vooral geneigd zijn deze regel te gebruiken als de druk om hun keuzes te verantwoorden 
hoog is (i.e., onder accountability). Maar hoe verantwoorden ze hun gedrag dan bij 
onzekerheid? In dit hoofdstuk werd gesteld dat groepsleden hun keuzes dan konden 
verantwoorden door coöperatieve keuzes te maken, hetgeen bij onzekerheid inhoudt 
dat mensen hun keuzes beperken. Minder nemen is beter te verantwoorden dan meer 
nemen, omdat dit overeenkomt met een algemeen geldende norm van coöperatie (zie 
Kerr, 1995). In dit hoofdstuk werd deze gedachtegang getoetst door middel van twee 
experimentele studies. De resultaten van deze studies ondersteunen de bovenstaande 
redenering.
 In hoofdstuk 5 werd onderzocht hoe groepsleden op elkaar zouden reageren 
als ze merkten dat het mis was gegaan bij omgevingsonzekerheid. Zouden ze boos 
op elkaar worden en elkaar de schuld geven als ze merkten dat de gezamenlijke bron 
overschreden was? Verwacht werd dat dit vooral het geval zou zijn bij zekerheid over 
de grootte van de bron. In dat geval weten de groepsleden immers zeker dat het mis 
is gegaan omdat minstens 1 van de groepsleden meer heeft genomen dan een gelijk 
deel. Ze zullen hun mede-groepsleden dus de schuld geven van het overschrijden van 
de bron en zullen daarom ook erg boos op hen worden. Bij brongrootte-onzekerheid is 
het echter veel onduidelijker waaraan het overschrijden te wijten is. Bovendien kunnen 
mensen in dit geval ook niet bepalen of groepsleden de gelijke-verdelingsregel hebben 
overschreden omdat het onduidelijkheid bestaat over de grootte van een gelijk deel. 
Verwacht werd dus dat mensen bij onzekerheid minder boos zouden worden op hun 
mede-groepsleden en hun minder de schuld zouden geven wanneer ze hoorden dat 
de bron was overschreden. Bovendien werd verwacht dat mensen bij onzekerheid hun 
groepsleden minder voor een dergelijke uitkomst zouden straffen dan bij zekerheid. De 
resultaten van 3 experimentele studies ondersteunen deze gedachtegang.
 In hoofdstuk 6 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift 
besproken. De algemene implicaties van deze bevindingen worden behandeld en er 
worden suggesties gedaan voor toekomstig onderzoek.
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